TSB Recommendation R25-01

In response to Recommendation R22-04 and other TSB recommendations regarding fail-safe physical defences, Transport Canada (TC) developed the enhanced train control (ETC) concept and reported that it had begun working with industry partners on several measures to advance its implementation. In February 2022, TC published a notice of intent outlining the next steps for implementing ETC technologies in Canada.

In 2023, a risk assessment methodology to guide the implementation of ETC in Canada was developed, and consultations on this issue were undertaken. This methodology assesses various factors, including passenger service, annual gross tonnage, and the status of key routes. The same year, guidelines for the interoperability of ETC applications were published by the Canadian Standards Association (CSA).

According to TC, draft regulations for the implementation of ETC technologies in Canada are expected to be pre-published in the Canada Gazette, Part I in 2026. TC also stated that the ETC implementation schedule will depend on the development of regulations.

Current administrative defences rely solely on train crews recognizing and complying with signal indications. However, numerous TSB investigations have identified various circumstances in which these administrative defences have failed. As highlighted in the TSB’s Rail Safety Advisory 01/24 and its letter to the Minister of Transport, the risks associated with failure to comply with signal indications remain high, and it is unlikely that the level of risk will be significantly reduced before physical fail-safe defences are implemented.

However, in recent years, several railway companies operating in Canada have, on their own initiative, introduced measures to partially compensate for the absence of such regulations by TC. Some companies have added additional administrative defences, while at least one other has integrated satellite geolocation technology (GPS).

For example, in order to reduce and eliminate distractions when a movement approaches a safety-critical situation, VIA Rail Canada Inc. and Canadian National Railway Company (CN) have each implemented the critical focus zone (CFZ). This is a set of special procedures to be applied when crew vigilance is of the utmost importance. When a CFZ is in effect, employees in the cab of a controlling locomotive must cease all communication and other tasks not related to the immediate operation of the train.

Following this occurrence, CN extended CFZ conditions to include situations where trains are required to operate at restricted speed. To be effective, however, CFZs require team members to recognize the conditions that place them in these situations. CFZs are therefore subject to the same limitations as other administrative defences in place.

CN also introduced a new special instruction under Canadian Rail Operating Rules (CROR) Rule 411. As of 19 October 2023, freight trains must reduce their speed by 10 mph below the maximum allowable speed when approaching a Clear to Stop signal, starting before passing the signal.

For its part, Quebec North Shore and Labrador Railway (QNS&L) has implemented a combined administrative and physical defence system, introducing proximity detection devices (PDDs) in 1997. PDDs are equipped with GPS to determine the position, direction, and speed of locomotives and maintenance vehicles equipped with these devices. They are configured to receive alerts of approaching movements. The conductors of both movements must confirm on a screen that they have acknowledged the alert and must communicate with each other by radio to verify their respective positions. A penalty brake is automatically applied to the locomotive of a train whose crew has not acknowledged receipt of the alert. Despite this technology, a PDD will not prevent a collision if the train crew acknowledges receiving an alert without reducing speed or stopping the train in time.

These examples of initiatives implemented by some railway companies are a step in the right direction pending the implementation of ETC, which TC has stated it intends to implement in accordance with the objectives of its Transportation 2030 strategic plan.

As of the release of this report, TC had not yet completed many of the necessary steps to implement ETC in Canada, including corridor risk assessments. Given the scope and complexity of some of these critical actions, it is unlikely that such a system will be developed and implemented within the next few years. If train control systems rely solely on administrative defences, there will be no automatic intervention to stop trains if train crews fail to follow signals or misinterpret them, increasing the risk of accidents.

Pending the implementation of ETC in Canada, no interim measures are required or planned by TC to reduce the risk of train collisions. Consequently, in the coming years, there will be few or no regulatory physical defences to stop a train when a crew fails to follow a signal indication.

Therefore, the Board recommended that