The Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) is responsible for advancing transportation safety. One of the ways it does this is by making recommendations to federal departments and other organizations to eliminate or reduce safety deficiencies.
Under our Act, federal ministers must formally respond to TSB recommendations and explain how they have addressed or will address the safety deficiencies. The Board evaluates the responses and their overall effectiveness, assessing them as Fully Satisfactory, Satisfactory Intent, Satisfactory in Part or Unsatisfactory, and assigning them a status of Active, Dormant, or Closed (see the definitions in the Assessment Rating Guide). Progress made to address TSB recommendations is assessed by the Board on an ongoing basis.
Responses to recommendations assessed to be Fully Satisfactory are assigned Closed status. Before 2014, the term Inactive was used instead of Closed. Although the index below has been changed to reflect the use of the new terminology, the underlying reassessment documents may not have been.
For recommendations and assessments made before 1 January 2005, please refer to our annual reports.
To read the full assessment of a recommendation, click on the recommendation number.
|Number||Recommendation||Source report||Current assessment||Status|
|P97-02||The National Energy Board reassess the adequacy of the emergency shut-down systems at compressor stations, with a view to ensuring that operators are aware of the operating status of the system under emergency conditions.||P95H0036||Fully satisfactory||Closed|
|P97-01||The National Energy Board reassess the design provisions for "emergency shut-down" anywhere in the pipeline system with a view to ensuring the rapid isolation from the flow of product in the event of a ruptured line.||P95H0036||Fully satisfactory||Closed|
|P95-02||The National Energy Board identify and undertake corrective measures for pipelines manufactured to standard CAN/CSA-Z245.2-M1979 Grade 483 Category II operating in environments where there is a potential for hydrogen induced cracking.||P94H0003||Fully satisfactory||Closed|
|P95-01||The National Energy Board, in conjunction with the Canadian Standards Association, re-evaluate the standards for steel pipe manufacturing with respect to the prevention of hydrogen entrapment within the pipe wall.||P94H0003||Fully satisfactory||Closed|
|P94-01||The National Energy Board review the records of manufacturing defects in the electric resistance weld seams of other pipeline companies and assess the inherent risk of leaks or failures.||P91H0109*||Fully satisfactory||Closed|
|P92-06||The National Energy Board ensure that, in an emergency, sections of line beyond crossover points on federally regulated pipelines can be quickly and safely isolated.||P90H0606*||Fully satisfactory||Closed|
*These older reports are not available on the website. For more information, contact us.
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