Air

The Canadian Transportation Accident Investigation and Safety Board Act requires that federal Ministers provide formal responses to the TSB as to action taken or planned in response to our recommendations.

The Board also makes recommendations to other organizations and will assess all these responses and evaluate the degree to which they address the safety issues and deficiencies using an Assessment Rating Guide.

For recommendations and assessments made prior to January 1, 2005, please refer to our Annual Reports.

Air Recommendations and Assessments of Responses

Recommendation A06-10
That to reduce the number of post-impact fires in impact-survivable accidents involving existing production aircraft weighing less than 5700 kg, Transport Canada, the Federal Aviation Administration, and other foreign regulators conduct risk assessments to determine the feasibility of retrofitting aircraft with the following:

• selected technology to eliminate hot items as a potential ignition source;
• technology designed to inert the battery and electrical systems at impact to eliminate high-temperature electrical arcing as a potential ignition source;
• protective or sacrificial insulating materials in locations that are vulnerable to friction heating and sparking during accidents to eliminate friction sparking as a potential ignition source; and
• selected fuel system crashworthiness components that retain fuel.

(SII A05-01)
Awaiting Response

Recommendation A06-09
That to reduce the number of post-impact fires in impact-survivable accidents involving new production aeroplanes weighing less than 5700 kg, Transport Canada, the Federal Aviation Administration, and other foreign regulators include in new aeroplane type design standards:

• methods to reduce the risk of hot items becoming ignition sources;
• technology designed to inert the battery and electrical systems at impact to eliminate high-temperature electrical arcing as a potential ignition source;
• requirements for protective or sacrificial insulating materials in locations that are vulnerable to friction heating and sparking during accidents to eliminate friction sparking as a potential ignition source;
• requirements for fuel system crashworthiness;
• requirements for fuel tanks to be located as far as possible from the occupied areas of the aircraft and for fuel lines to be routed outside the occupied areas of the aircraft to increase the distance between the occupants and the fuel; and
• improved standards for exits, restraint systems, and seats to enhance survivability and opportunities for occupant escape.

(SII A05-01)
Awaiting Response

Recommendation A06-08
That Transport Canada, together with the Federal Aviation Administration and other foreign regulators, revise the cost-benefit analysis for Notice of Proposed Rule Making 85-7A using Canadian post-impact fire statistics and current value of statistical life rates, and with consideration to the newest advances in post-impact fire prevention technology. (SII A05-01)
Awaiting Response

Recommendation A06-07
That the Department of Transport, in conjunction with the International Civil Aviation Organization, the Federal Aviation Administration, the European Aviation Safety Agency, and other regulatory organizations, establish a requirement for transport category aircraft to be equipped with a take-off performance monitoring system that would provide flight crews with an accurate and timely indication of inadequate take-off performance. (A04H0004)
Response      Assessment/Reassessment
Rating: Satisfactory Intent

Recommendation A06-06
That the European Aviation Safety Agency, in coordination with other involved regulatory authorities and industry, urgently develop and implement an inspection program that will allow early and consistent detection of damage to the rudder assembly of aircraft equipped with part number A55471500 series rudders. (A05F0047)
Response (22 November 2006)     Response (17 January 2007)
Assessment
Rating: Satisfactory Intent

Recommendation A06-05
That the Department of Transport, in coordination with other involved regulatory authorities and industry, urgently develop and implement an inspection program that will allow early and consistent detection of damage to the rudder assembly of aircraft equipped with part number A55471500 series rudders. (A05F0047)
Response      Assessment
Rating: Satisfactory Intent

Recommendation A06-04
That the Federal Aviation Administration require that Cessna 208 operators maintain a minimum operating airspeed of 120 knots during icing conditions and exit icing conditions as soon as performance degradations prevent the aircraft from maintaining 120 knots. (A05C0187)
Response      Assessment
Rating: Fully Satisfactory

Recommendation A06-03
That the Federal Aviation Administration take action to revise the certification of Cessna 208, 208A, and 208B aircraft to prohibit flight into forecast or in actual icing meteorological conditions exceeding "light," until the airworthiness of the aircraft to operate in such conditions is demonstrated. (A05C0187)
Response      Assessment/Reassessment
Rating: Satisfactory in Part

Recommendation A06-02
That the Department of Transport require that Canadian Cessna 208 operators maintain a minimum operating airspeed of 120 knots during icing conditions and exit icing conditions as soon as performance degradations prevent the aircraft from maintaining 120 knots. (A05C0187)
Response      Assessment
Rating: Fully Satisfactory

Recommendation A06-01
That the Department of Transport take action to restrict the dispatch of Canadian Cessna 208, 208A, and 208B aircraft into forecast icing meteorological conditions exceeding "light," and prohibit the continued operation in these conditions, until the airworthiness of the aircraft to operate in such conditions is demonstrated. (A05C0187)
Response      Assessment
Rating: Satisfactory in Part