MARINE Reports - 2005 - M05L0203

2.0 Analysis

2.1 Cause of the Blackout

2.1.1 Short Circuit

An arc occurs between two conducting electrodes separated by a gap filled with a gas such as air. In this occurrence, one of the electrodes was the bus bar and the other was the steel bracket. When a suitable voltage is supplied, a spark forms, ionizing the gas and drastically reducing its electrical resistance. This is normally prevented by inserting an insulation piece.

The H-shaped piece of bakelite from the insulation arrangement that rests against the steel bracket between the three bus bars was missing at the time of the blackout. This piece had fallen out of place some time before the occurrence. This insulation piece, which is approximately 6 mm thick, showed signs of indentation where the bars rested, indicating that the bars had a tendency to move toward the bracket as the breaker mated with the bus bars. Given the absence of the insulation piece, the spacing (gap) between the edge of bus bars and the bracket would have been less than 6 mm on each such occasion.

The reduced gap would increase the possibility of an arc occurring, and this was a factor in the arcing of the bus bars, but it was not likely the initiating factor, since the reduced gap had been present for some time.²¹

The humidity in the switchboard area is normally quite high and there was high humidity at the time of the occurrence. However, as humidity increases, there are fewer free ions in the air, and thus there is a decrease in the ability of an electron to move across an air gap, meaning that an arc will be less likely.

Furthermore, since the ship was carrying iron ore, the ore dust could have settled on various parts. This dust was likely partially conductive, which would have increased the probability of arcing. However, this was not likely the initiating factor because the vessel had previously loaded iron ore without arcing occurring.

The marking inside the connection box of the aft air compressor (see Photo 16) was fresh, indicating that a single contact followed by repulsion may have created a build-up of electrical potential within the ship's structure in way of the switchboard steel bracket. This condition appeared new at the time of the occurrence.

The air compressor circuit breaker is meant to instantly protect from phase-to-phase shorts, as opposed to single phase-to-ground shorts; thus, although the breaker would open on a short to ground, it would take much longer. The single contact could have created a potential (voltage) spike on the main buses, thereby increasing the potential across the air gap between the edge of the bus bars and the steel bracket. This led to an instantaneous three-phase arcing short circuit that occurred on the No. 1 ballast pump supply bus bars, located downstream of MCC A1.

The missing insulator was one of the necessary conditions that contributed to causing the blackout. Because the insulator had been missing for some time without any adverse consequence, it would not likely have been the only condition. Many conditions were present, increasing the possibility of an arc occurring; however, the addition of the short to ground on the air compressor line likely added the extra potential needed for the bus bars to arc the way they did in this occurrence.

Figure 2.

Circuit breaker line diagram

2.1.2 Coordination of Electrical Protective Devices

The fault in the air compressor likely triggered an arc short circuit on the No. 1 ballast pump bus bar. The upstream MCC A1 breaker tripped. However, both generator circuit breakers also tripped simultaneously as a result of this short circuit, indicating inadequate breaker coordination. The resulting blackout left the vessel without steering.

The 1976 edition of TP 127, section 17(2), required overload and short-circuit protection to be arranged so that effective discrimination is achieved as far as practicable throughout the installation. The 1987 edition of TP 127 introduced the requirement to submit to TC, for new vessels, a "Coordination Study of Main and Emergency Distribution Systems."

This ensures that essential services further upstream are not disrupted allowing the rest of the power system to remain in service.

2.2 Steering Gear

When navigating in any restricted waters, steering is vital and must be regained as soon as possible after a blackout. Engine room personnel, however, often focus on restoring the main propulsion plant in such circumstances, and as such the steering gear pump may not be made available in a timely manner. In this occurrence, engineers concentrated on restoring propulsion requirements, and the steering gear pump was restarted later. Even if the vessel's blackout procedure had been followed exactly, the phrase "feed steering gear" could be misinterpreted because it does not specifically say "start" steering gear (that is, electrical power may have been restored to the steering gear, but the electrically powered motor of the steering gear pump may not have been restarted).

Although electrical power was regained within 18 seconds following the blackout, the vessel's steerage capability was not automatically restored. Given that the vessel had headway with reducing propulsion, the vessel continued to sheer until grounding.

The 1980 edition of TP 127 Section 11(15) states that: "The control of each steering gear motor is to be such that the motor will restart automatically upon restoration of voltage after a power failure." Other Canadian vessels built before 1980 may have arrangements similar to the Canadian Leader; that is, their steering gear does not immediately restart, putting them at risk of a loss of steering following a blackout.

2.3 Awareness of Water in the Cargo Hold

Timely detection of water ingress into a loaded bulk carrier's cargo hold is vital for many reasons, especially when aground. Such information influences the decisions as to whether refloating attempts or other salvage options should be considered.

In this occurrence, the Canadian Leader was not equipped with water-level detection equipment for the hold, be it sounding pipes or water-level alarms. Consequently, vessel personnel were unaware of the water ingress until the booby hatch to the forward hold was opened some 10 hours after the grounding. By that time, the single cargo hold had progressively flooded aft past non-watertight cargo screen bulkheads.

In 2002, the IMO adopted a number of amendments to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), 1974. One new regulation requires each cargo hold on a bulk carrier - regardless of the vessel's construction date - to be fitted with water-level detectors.²² SOLAS requirements do not apply to Canadian inland waters bulk carriers such as the Canadian Leader. The Canada Shipping Act, 2001 regulatory reform, currently underway, will introduce a proposal for similar requirements regarding water-level detectors in cargo holds as found in SOLAS.

Vessels not fitted with means to detect water in the cargo hold are at risk in the event of water ingress.

2.4 Cargo Hold Pumping

A vessel must be able to efficiently pump water from any compartment, including the cargo hold, under normal conditions of trim and heel. Vessels that are unable to pump out water from their holds are at risk in the event of water ingress. Regulations recognize the need to be able to pump from both forward and aft in a single cargo hold; however, the Canadian Leader, exempt from such requirements, was fitted with only aft bilge wells. When the vessel developed a trim by the head after grounding, water located in the forward part of the cargo hold could not be pumped out.

The effectiveness of a bilge pumping arrangement depends on the extent of damage to the vessel's cargo hold, and how the system might be affected by the cargo and/or the material covering the strainer plates.

To prevent the iron ore pellets from entering the bilge wells, the strainer plate perforations were sealed off using, among other material, plastic sheeting that rendered the bilge pumping arrangement ineffective. This is a common practice on Great Lakes bulk carriers. Compromising the ability to pump water from the cargo hold could impair the vessel's stability to a point where it could contribute to a more serious occurrence.

2.5 Emergency Response Plans

In the event of a marine emergency concerning a vessel in a restricted waterway such as the St. Lawrence River, emergency preparedness concerns not only the personnel on board the vessel, but that of the vessel's company staff and the relevant governmental authorities. TC is responsible for "the safe operation, navigation, design and maintenance of ships, the protection of life and property, and prevention of ship source pollution."²³ The Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO) is responsible for safe and accessible waterways, healthy and productive aquatic ecosystems, and sustainable fisheries and aquaculture.²⁴ The management of events after an emergency is a complex operation, and decisions must be made in a timely manner. This analysis will focus on the emergency preparedness of all parties in order to highlight any residual risks.

2.5.1 Marine Emergency Response Plan - Company

SMT manages a fleet of ships, and the company's Marine Emergency Response Plan (MERP) is the template for dealing with emergencies. Although this plan states that compartments are to be sounded subsequent to grounding, the plan does not specifically mention the need to monitor cargo holds for water ingress. In a single-cargo-hold vessel, it is paramount to be aware of any water entering the hold, and, in this instance, the discovery of water in the hold changed the salvage situation dramatically.

As both of the hold's bilge wells were located aft and had been sealed before loading the cargo, the vessel could not use its ballast pumps to cope with the water ingress in the cargo hold. The shipboard SMS procedures for pumping made reference to four bilge suctions - two in the centre of the cargo hold (port and starboard) and two in the aft end of the cargo hold. As such, the vessel's SMS documentation with respect to bilge pumping arrangements was not ship-specific.

The company's plan reads as follows: ". . . Whenever grounding occurs, the potential for a pollution incident . . . always exists." Based on information at hand that indicated no damage to fuel tanks and therefore no threat of pollution, at 1810, SMT declined the services of the Eastern Canada Response Corporation (ECRC).

The vessel was capable of pumping water from the No. 1 starboard ballast tank. It did not have the capability to pump water directly from the cargo hold and therefore it was in a potentially dangerous situation. Portable salvage pumps were ordered and arrived at 2130.

2.5.2 Marine Emergency Response Plan - Vessel

Soon after the grounding, the crew sounded the compartments and took soundings around the vessel's perimeter to evaluate the situation. An initial attempt to free the vessel was made around 0400, and a second one soon after the tug Avantage arrived. That attempt ended at 0510 when one towline slipped off a hook and the other broke. Had either of the attempts been successful, without the knowledge of the hold flooding, there was a risk that the vessel may have later sunk in the channel.

Emergency preparedness plans cannot predict every contingency. They can, however, set out directives and procedures for complex, pressure-filled scenarios where there is little margin for error. A checklist of questions alone is a poor substitute for a proper vessel emergency plan.

• Bilges and ballast tanks sounded?
  
  
• Engines and steering secured?
  
  
• List and trim noted?
  
  
• Assessment of cargo conditions?
  
  
• Assessment of any pollution or potential pollution?
  
  
• Overall conditions assessed in terms of risks of safety to crew, vessel, and cargo?

These statements provide no direct guidance should water ingress be found. They provide no schedule to continue sounding. They provide no method or guidance to ascertain if water is entering the cargo spaces. Furthermore, they do not offer guidance on pulling with tugs, the safe working load of bollards, or other precautions. The IMO has, for example, documented the failure of mooring equipment under heavy load, and has noted its concern in the past.²⁵

Shipboard emergency response plans should be read and initialled by officers and, if possible, practised to ensure familiarity. They should also be made available to crew members such that all hands have a good understanding of requirements given certain circumstances.

In the case of a grounded vessel, all risks must be assessed before any self-refloating attempt, and appropriate measures must be put in place to mitigate those risks. Otherwise, adverse consequences can occur.

In this instance, the Canadian Leader's emergency plan - although inadequate by nature of its incomplete question-checklist format - was not even followed. Water in the hold was only discovered by chance some 10 hours after the grounding, whereas the use of a more comprehensive emergency response plan could have made an earlier discovery possible.

2.5.3 Proposed Salvage Plan

The proposed salvage plan was sent to government authorities at 1734 on 27 September 2005; TC raised several concerns and the DFO also asked for some additional information to be clarified. The plan was accepted later that evening despite lacking essential details, such as:

• predicted tides and currents;
  
  
• calculations of the forces exerted by the current on the hull;
  
  
• expected weather;
  
  
• mooring bitt strength assessment;
  
  
• exact nature of sea bottom;
  
  
• estimated force and location of ground reaction; and
  
  
• estimated force needed to free the vessel and available bollard pull.

2.5.4 Governmental Authorities

TC and the DFO have responsibilities that include the safety of persons, the vessel, the waterway, and the environment. They must, therefore, develop, implement, and exercise contingency plans to ensure that risks associated with navigation-related emergencies are adequately addressed. The CSA provides the legislative basis for TC and the DFO to take the necessary action to prevent the possibility of pollution. Furthermore, the DFO states in a notice to owners that, if the desired information - in this case the salvage plan - is not submitted before a specified time, the department will have no choice but to initiate appropriate corrective actions to remedy the situation for, and in the name of, the ship owner.

Informed decisions and appropriate corrective actions for marine emergencies can only be achieved if serious, in-depth pre-planning has been done. Although vessel owners are responsible for the salvage of their vessels, government authorities must nonetheless assess the timeliness/appropriateness of the emergency response and, if necessary, give directions or take charge. This can only be achieved if substantial contingency planning is done ahead of time to develop ready-made emergency plans.

The response to TSB Recommendation M03-03 was assessed as Satisfactory in Part. This, in addition to the Safety Concern that followed the Yong Kang investigation and the investigation into the Horizon grounding,²⁶ indicates that there continue to be inadequacies in the preparedness and coordination of emergency response.

In this instance, had either of the first two refloating attempts been successful - both of which were made outside the scope of an approved salvage/refloating plan and carried out with no format approval - measures were not in place to deal with the potential risks.

Canadian authorities continue to operate without the benefit of comprehensive contingency plans when confronted with marine emergencies such as groundings.

3.0 Conclusions

3.1 Findings as to Causes and Contributing Factors

1. A ground fault in the aft air compressor, which likely created a potential (voltage) build-up (spike) between the main buses and the bracket, combined with the missing bakelite insulator and the reduced air gap between the edge of the bus bars and the steel bracket, caused arcing to take place.
   
   
2. When arcing started in one phase, it spread to the other two phases, causing a short circuit downstream of the motor control centre A1 (MCC A1) bus bar.
   
   
3. Inadequate breaker coordination caused MCC A1 and the two main generator circuit breakers to open, causing a blackout.
   
   
4. The blackout deprived the vessel of helm control, which was not immediately restored when electrical power was regained, resulting in the vessel grounding.

3.2 Findings as to Risk

1. An inadequately coordinated tripping sequence failed to immediately isolate an affected section of the switchboard, thereby increasing the risk of creating a blackout.
   
   
2. Other Canadian vessels may have arrangements similar to the Canadian Leader whereby their steering gear does not automatically restart, potentially prolonging the duration of a loss of steering following a blackout.
   
   
3. Vessels not fitted with means to detect water or that are unable to pump water out of their holds are at risk in the event of water ingress.
   
   
4. The strainer plates were sealed off, rendering the cargo hold bilge pumping arrangement ineffective.
   
   
5. The company's Marine Emergency Response Plan (MERP) states that compartments are to be sounded subsequent to grounding, but it does not specifically mention the need to monitor cargo holds for water ingress, which increases the risk that water ingress may go undetected.
   
   
6. The vessel's MERP - itself inadequate by nature of its incomplete question-checklist format - was not followed, and risks were not assessed.
   
   
7. Either of the first two refloating attempts, made outside the scope of an approved salvage/refloating plan and carried out with no formal approval, could have resulted in a more serious occurrence had they been successful.
   
   
8. Canadian authorities continue to operate without the benefit of comprehensive contingency plans when confronted with marine emergencies such as groundings.
   
   
9. There are no specific requirements concerning bus insulators and supports in the periodic inspection of a vessel's switchboards.

3.3 Other Findings

1. The cargo hold bilge well strainer plates had holes of 25 mm in diameter, rather than the maximum of 10 mm.
   
   
2. The vessel's Safety Management System documentation with respect to cargo hold bilge pumping arrangements was not ship-specific.

4.0 Safety Action

4.1 Action Taken

4.1.1

Coordination of Electrical Protection Devices and Switchboards

On 04 April 2006, the TSB issued Marine Safety Information Letter (MSI) 03/06 to the ship manager, Seaway Marine Transport (SMT) with a copy sent to Transport Canada (TC). This letter expressed concern that, after the two main generators and motor control centre A1 (MCC A1) circuit breakers had been sent ashore for testing, no coordination test was conducted after their re-installation and that, as a consequence, the tripping sequence relationship between those breakers remained unknown and could present a risk to the vessel.

TC responded that only new installations are required (under Section 36 of the Ships Electrical Standards (TP 127)) to submit, among others, a "Coordination Study of Main and Emergency Distribution Systems" for evaluation. There is no regulatory requirement for a test following the replacement or recalibration of equipment. TC also stated that it is not recommended to conduct a test to prove the coordination of protective devices due to the possible destructive/dangerous consequences of such a test.

SMT informed the TSB that electrical inspection procedures for switchboards and feeder breakers have been enhanced to include testing in conjunction with the main generator breakers every five years. SMT has since issued Circular Letter 77-2005 to all chief engineers; infrared scans are now performed yearly fleet-wide as a preventative action and regular inspections and cleaning to detect and correct any switchboard defects have also been put in place. The company will consider upgrading the MCC's breaker protection with electronic trips, similar to those on the main breakers if tests indicate a potential problem.

Similarly designed switchboards and breakers on other SMT ships were identified. During the winter layup period of 2006, a detailed inspection of the insulation was carried out to identify any defects for correction. None were found and these identified ships are now on a similar inspection program as the Canadian Leader.

4.1.1.1 Steering Gear

Following this occurrence, SMT made modifications to the Canadian Leader's steering gear, making one pump start automatically once power is restored after a blackout. Similar ships in the SMT fleet were surveyed and retrofitted as necessary with either a wheelhouse-fitted steering pump start switch and/or a one-pump automatic start mechanism to coincide with power restoration following a blackout. This was completed during the winter layup of 2006.

4.1.2 Water Detection and Bilge Pumping Arrangement

On 28 February 2006, the TSB issued Marine Safety Advisory (MSA) 02/06 to TC, with a copy sent to SMT. This MSA indicated several practices that may not be limited to the vessel or ship manager, including the lack of means to detect water in a single cargo hold, the use of strainer plates with holes larger than 10 mm, and the sealing off of the cargo hold bilge wells when carrying permeable cargoes.

On 15 November 2006, TC updated an earlier response, stating that the size of the holes in the strainer plates was not relevant in this occurrence and that covering the strainer plates with plastic ensures that bilge and ballast arrangements are free of debris. Furthermore, in relation to water ingress detection, TC states that, due to the rarity of a ruptured tank top, the present system of detection is considered adequate for existing vessels.

A further update on 16 March 2007 advises that TC has conferred with vessel operators to investigate practices highlighted in the advisory. However, there is no indication of any changes made. Furthermore, it has been considered that it is not appropriate to publish a Ship Safety Bulletin, but that further consultation with vessel operators is required with respect to the issue of strainer plate holes and coverings.

SMT's Marine Emergency Response Plans (MERPs) have been amended to reflect the need for assessing cargo hold conditions (breaching of ballast tanks) during grounding with respect to salvage plans.

4.1.3 Safety Management System - Procedures

On 06 December 2005, SMT modified its procedures, which reflect a correction that made the number of bilge wells vessel-specific. In particular, the sentence referring to "four wells" was amended to read "two wells."

4.1.4 Emergency Preparedness

On 20 June 2006, SMT stated in a letter to the TSB that the effectiveness of the company's MERP was reviewed using the response to the Canadian Leader accident. More specific details have since been added to the various emergency response sections, so as to provide improved guidance in the management of an occurrence. A further review has taken place as recently as November 2007, and the 2008 revision will reflect these changes and improvements.

4.2 Safety Concerns

4.2.1 Adequacy of Emergency Preparedness

When responding to an occurrence, specific issues often emerge that dominate the response effort and affect the outcome. Following such an occurrence, it is prudent for the authorities to re-examine their preparedness, planning, and response activities in order to take appropriate and timely measures to address these issues. An example of this has been the United Kingdom government's approach to removing or reducing the risk to persons or property during occurrences involving vessels. In response to recommendations following the grounding of the oil tanker Sea Empress in 1996, a new role was created for a single representative, the Secretary of State's Representative (SOSREP), to oversee and to exercise ultimate command and control in maritime salvage and intervention operations. In January 2007, the containership MSC Napoli sustained serious damage to its hull and was abandoned. While under tow to a safe haven, its condition deteriorated seriously enough that the SOSREP ordered that the vessel be intentionally grounded in a specific location to minimize the prospect of pollution and to facilitate anticipated salvage operations.

The need for a planned and coordinated approach to deal with navigation-related emergencies in Canadian waters, while supporting the vessel owner's efforts to deal with an occurrence, was recognized by the Board in its investigation into the 1999 grounding of the bulk carrier Alcor.²⁷ As a result of that investigation, the Board recommended that:

The Department of Transport, the Department of Fisheries and Oceans, and Canadian pilotage authorities, in consultation with marine interests, develop, implement, and exercise contingency plans to ensure that risks associated with navigation-related emergencies are adequately addressed.

(M03-03, issued January 2004)

In response, both Quebec regional directorates - Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO) Marine Programs and TC Marine Safety - identified the respective departmental roles where coordinated efforts are required. Together, they developed procedures to assess risk situations and carried out an alerting exercise in 2006. However, this action was a regional effort that did not address all the issues required for an effective, timely response. Furthermore, there is no information to suggest that such a nationwide plan is being implemented.

Given Canada's extensive coastline, its intricate waterway system, and the large number of vessels constantly in service throughout the country, the probability of a serious marine accident taking place cannot be discounted. For example, an average of 95 groundings and/or strikings involving commercial vessels occurs in Canadian waters each year.²⁸ The Board, meanwhile, has continued to identify contingency planning deficiencies as a key factor in a number of occurrences.²⁹

Following the grounding of the vessel Horizon in 2004, the DFO indicated that area-specific risk assessments and contingency plans could not be undertaken due to a lack of available human and financial resources. The Board, however, believes that this work is crucial to establishing effective and timely risk-based decision-making procedures to protect persons, property and the environment in the event of groundings. In the occurrence involving the Canadian Leader, the response to the grounding did not adequately address the risks involved. There were no comprehensive contingency plans in place, and the first two refloating attempts were made without the benefit of a comprehensive salvage/refloating plan.

The Board acknowledges the actions taken by TC and the DFO to date specifically in developing re-floating plans in the event of grounding. However, the Board believes that more tangible, nationwide action involving marine interest groups and agencies is necessary. Since Recommendation M03-03 was issued more than four years ago, a coordinated nationwide approach has yet to be realized. The Board is concerned that the slow progress toward developing, implementing, and exercising marine contingency plans results in a continuing risk to vessels, crew members, and the environment.

4.2.2 Detection of Water Ingress

When the Canadian Leader grounded, the No. 1 starboard ballast tank was extensively damaged, and the tank top was ruptured. As a consequence, once the ballast tank flooded to the level of the cargo hold, water began entering the cargo hold.

The Canadian Leader was not equipped with water-level detection equipment in the hold, be it a sounding pipe or water-level detector. Consequently, the crew was unaware of the presence of the water ingress until the booby hatch to the forward hold was opened some 10 hours after grounding. By that time, the single cargo hold had progressively flooded aft past non-watertight transverse cargo screen bulkheads. To prevent the iron ore pellets from entering the bilge wells, the strainer plate perforations had been previously sealed off using, among other material, plastic sheeting that rendered the pumping arrangement to the cargo hold unusable. This practice is presently used to a large extent on Great Lakes bulk carriers.

Timely detection of water ingress into a loaded bulk carrier's cargo hold is vital. Such information will influence the emergency measures undertaken when a vessel has sustained damage causing water ingress in the cargo hold. In 2002, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) adopted a number of amendments to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), 1974. One new regulation requires each cargo hold on a bulk carrier - regardless of the vessel's construction date - to be fitted with a water-level detector.

Currently, such requirements do not apply to Canadian inland waters bulk carriers such as the Canadian Leader. The Canada Shipping Act, 2001 regulatory reform, currently underway, will introduce a proposal for similar requirements regarding water-level detectors in cargo holds as found in SOLAS. Furthermore, SMT's MERPs have been amended to reflect the need for assessing cargo hold conditions (breaching of ballast tanks) during grounding with respect to salvage plans. However, such a visual inspection of the cargo hold for water would not detect early flooding in the event that the vessel was carrying cargo, and, as in this occurrence, the water would not be visible until it reaches the top of the cargo.

If water is entering the vessel, either from sources above or below the waterline, a vessel must be able to efficiently pump water from any compartment, including the cargo hold, under normal conditions of trim and heel. Although the permeability of some cargoes precludes effective pumping, permeable cargoes such as the iron ore pellets carried by the Canadian Leader do allow sufficient water flow-through.

The practice of sealing cargo hold strainer plates on Great Lakes bulk carriers is at odds with Safety Convention bulk carrier practice. The IMO Code of Safe Practice for Solid Bulk Cargoes requires, inter alia, that "attention is drawn particularly to bilge wells and strainer plates, which should be specially prepared to facilitate drainage and to prevent entry of the cargo into the bilge system."³⁰ Guidance is also provided in the Canadian Code of Safe Practice for Solid Bulk Cargoes (TP 5761) and the Grain Cargo Regulations.

Vessels plying domestic trade are not subject to pre-loading inspections as required for foreign trade vessels. Protection of cargo hold bilge wells is therefore not verified on domestic trade vessels.

The Board is therefore concerned that Great Lakes bulk carriers and their crews, which continue to operate without the benefit of water-detection systems in cargo holds, and continue the practice of sealing off cargo hold bilge wells, may be at undue risk in the event of the ingress of water into the cargo hold.

The Board will continue to monitor any action taken in relation to the above concern.

This report concludes the Transportation Safety Board's investigation into this occurrence. Consequently, the Board authorized the release of this report on 22 May 2008.

Appendices

• Appendix A - Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO) Questions and Comments
• Appendix B - Excerpts from Transport Canada Quebec Region - Marine Safety Response Guide
• Appendix C - List of Laboratory Reports
• Appendix D - Glossary

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Appendix A  -

Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO) Questions and Comments

DFO Response to the Salvage Plan of the Canadian Leader

• Who will be the master in charge of directing the tugs?
  
  
• Who will be the master in charge of the salvage operation?
  
  
• From where will the master in charge of the salvage operation direct the tugs?
  
  
• Proper communication system has to be used.
  
  
• What will be the role of the Canadian Leader's captain during the operation?
  
  
• Require the bridge to be manned according to good practices of bridge management.
  
  
• When will the pilot take charge of the vessel, and in which position relative to the channel?
  
  
• Each towing point on board the Canadian Leader should be crewed with direct communication with the towing master.
  
  
• The safe working load and the type of line should be sufficient according to the bollard pull of the tug.
  
  
• The towing point on the Canadian Leader should be reinforced if necessary.
  
  
• The head tug should have a safety line in case the main one breaks.
  
  
• The towing master to advise DFO on the possible obstruction of traffic, four hours prior to any operation.
  
  
• Port authority at destination to be advised, and port section to be given.
  
  
• If any pollution - or the threat of any pollution - occurs during the salvage or in transit, all action must be taken to stop and/or contain the loss of oil. In addition, all measures must be taken to protect the environment and the safety of life at sea.
  
  
• If any pollution - or the threat of any pollution - occurs at the port, all action must be taken to stop and/or contain the loss of oil. In addition, all measures must be taken to protect the environment and the safety of life at sea.

Appendix B  -

Excerpts from Transport Canada Quebec Region - Marine Safety Response Guide

Guideline #6 - Grounding

Mandate

Authority

Objectives

Required Information

Marine Safety Activities

Special Instruction

Other Parties

References

Mandate

Safety of life at sea

Protection of the environment

Authority

• Canada Shipping Act, Part V

s 310: inspect, ask questions, detain

s 377: report (Canadian ships only)

• Canada Shipping Act, Part XV

s 662 (1) b): go on board (Canadian ship)

s 662 (1) c): go on board (foreign ship)

s 662 (1) e): take samples

s 662 (1) f): direct

s 662 (1) i): collect information on SOPEP (Shipboard Oil Pollution Emergency Plan)

• Canada Shipping Act, Part VI,

s 478: report accidents and occurrences

• Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act,

s 15 (4) a): board

s 15 (4) b): order

Objectives

• Take measures to protect human life, the environment, property, and cargo.
  
  
• Check vessel for seaworthiness in accordance with Canadian legislation as well as applicable rules and conventions.
  
  
• Determine the causes of the grounding and recommend measures to prevent a repetition, and/or investigate possible violations of the CSA with a view to prosecution.
  
  
• Inform minister if necessary.

Required Information

• Particulars of vessel: see form
  
  
• Vessel's conditions: damage, potential risks for navigation, risk of pollution
  
  
• Environmental conditions: weather, tide, currents
  
  
• In case of risk of pollution, information on implementation of emergency plan (SOPEP)
  
  
• Causes of incident
  
  
• Vessel's intentions

Marine Safety Activities

• Obtain information from Alert and Warning Network (AWN)
  
  
• Request additional information if needed for decision-making
  
  
• Prohibit vessel from moving until refloating plan has been accepted (if necessary)

1.3 - Mechanical problems

1.4 - Ships (light draft) proceeding in ice

1.5 - Ships directed to obtain services of tug

1.6 - Drifting ships to remain at a certain distance from the coast

• Decide whether an inspector must be sent to site immediately.

If yes:

• Make travel arrangements for an inspector (see transportation)
  
  
• Ensure inspector's working conditions will be safe
  
  
• Send inspector immediately to assess vessel condition and investigate
  
  
• Coordinate inspector's activities and provide support
  
  
• Validate decisions throughout the process if necessary
  
  
• Report regularly to AWN
  
  
• Liaise with CCG (re: pollution, protection of navigable waters)
  
  
• Request report from shipboard inspector in order to obtain supplementary information
  
  
• Assess damage and make decisions about refloating (interaction with shipping agent, CCG, and other organizations involved)
  
  
• Accept refloating plan
  
  
• Report to Director General if necessary; information note
  
  
• See "After refloating" below

If not, reasons:

• Vessel refloated by itself
  
  
• Combination of factors: causes are not related to vessel safety, environmental features are known (nature of bottom, tides, etc), no risk of pollution or leakage

After refloating:

• Check vessel condition, reliability of machinery, and auxiliary systems
  
  
• Direct vessel and/or accept its destination if necessary
  
  
• Issue detaining order once the vessel has arrived at its destination
  
  
• Recommend internal inspection by inspector, Classification Society, and others concerned, and recommend external inspection by divers to assess damage
  
  
• Evaluate the damage and follow up temporary repairs, permanent repairs, dry-dock work, and conditions of class
  
  
• Obtain hazardous incident report from the captain
  
  
• Report to the Director General
  
  
• When finished, lift the detaining order, close the file, and if necessary pass on information to other parties

Special Instructions

Other Parties

• See AWN grid
  
  
• Classification society
  
  
• Shipping agents
  
  
• Administration

References

Échouement du navire Alcor, Questions juridiques (Note de service MPO 24/11/2000) (Grounding of Vessel Alcor, Legal Issues (Memorandum DFO 24/11/2000))

Appendix C - List of Laboratory Reports

The following TSB Engineering Laboratory report was prepared:

LP 018/2006 - Bus Bar Examination, Bulk Carrier Canadian Leader

This report is available from the Transportation Safety Board of Canada upon request.

Appendix D - Glossary

A		ampere
AWN		Alert and Warning Network
CB		circuit breaker
CCG		Canadian Coast Guard
CSA		Canada Shipping Act
DFO		Department of Fisheries and Oceans
ECRC		Eastern Canada Response Corporation
G		Gyro (degrees)
Gen		generator
ICS		Incident Command System
IMO		International Maritime Organization
ISM		International Safety Management
ISO		International Organization for Standardization
ITE		inverse time element
kW		kilowatt
m		metre
MCC		motor control centre
MCTS		Marine Communication and Traffic Services
MERP		Marine Emergency Response Plan
mm		millimetre
N		north
OOW		officer of the watch
SMS		Safety Management System
SMT		Seaway Marine Transport
SOLAS		International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea
SOPEP		Shipboard Oil Pollution Emergency Plan
SOSREP		Secretary of State's Representative
TC		Transport Canada
TP		Transport publication
TP 127E		Ships Electrical Standards
TSB		Transportation Safety Board of Canada
W		west
º		degree
'		minute
"		second

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1.   Units of measurement in this report conform to International Maritime Organization (IMO) standards or, where there is no such standard, are expressed in the International System of units.

2.   See Glossary at Appendix D for all abbreviations and acronyms.

3.   All times are eastern daylight time (Coordinated Universal Time minus four hours).

4.   ECRC provides marine response services in pollution cases, when requested, to the "responsible party," the Department of Fisheries and Oceans, or to any other government lead agency. SMT has a contract with ECRC to provide these services in the event of an oil spill.

5.   Environment Canada, hourly data, 26 September 2005, indicated for the whole day a relative humidity of 99 per cent.

6.   Canada Shipping Act, Marine Machinery Regulations, Schedule XV, Bilge and Ballast Systems, Part 1, Division II, sections 48 and 51(a).

7.   Marine Machinery Regulations, Schedule XV, Part 1, Division 2, sections 53 and 118.

8.   From Wabush Mines Laboratory

9.   Inverse Time Element ©

10.   ITE © K1600

11.   ITE © K600

12.   ITE © OD3 - oil dashpot

13.   Westinghouse © Amptector - Model I-AL1. Previously fitted oil dashpot electro-mechanical trips replaced with solid-state trip units in early 1990s.

14.   TP 127E (09/2007), Section 8.3

15.   TSB Engineering Laboratory Report LP 018/2006

16.   Section 01 - Upper Lakes Group Inc. Blackout Procedure (31 January 1997, Revision.01).

17.   Marine Machinery Regulations, Schedule VII, Part I, Division 1, Section 16.

18.   TSB report M99L0126

19.   TSB report M03L0148

20.   This framework is part of a pilot project that covers the Quebec region.

21.   TSB Engineering Laboratory report LP 018/2006

22.   Regulation 12 - Hold, ballast, and dry-space water-level detectors - was added to Chapter XII (Additional Safety Measures for Bulk Carriers).

23.   Transport Canada, Marine Safety Mandate, The Way Ahead - Marine Safety Strategic Plan, 1997-2002 (TP 13111).

24.   Fisheries and Oceans Canada, 2005-2010 Strategic Plan: Our Waters, Our Future.

25.   Sub-Committee on Safety of Navigation (NAV 49/6), 25 April 2003.

26.   TSB report M04L0092

27.   Marine investigation report M99L0126. Other investigations during that time featured similar issues, notably M01C0054 (Windoc) and M01M0017 (Kitano).

28.   Commercial vessels includes cargo vessels, ferries, tankers, passenger vessels, tugs, barges, and fishing vessels.

29.   Marine investigation reports M03L0148 (Yong Kang) and M04L0092 (Horizon).

30.   The Cargo, Fumigation and Tackle Regulations, which came into force on 01 July 2007, now incorporate this Code as mandatory and therefore the requirements in this regard.