MARINE Reports - 2005 - M05L0203

Table of Contents

1.0 Factual Information

• 1.1 Particulars of the Vessel
• 1.1.1 Description of the Vessel
• 1.2 History of the Voyage
• 1.2.1 Grounding
• 1.2.2 Salvage
• 1.3 Injuries to Persons
• 1.4 Damage
• 1.5 Certification
• 1.5.1 Vessel
• 1.5.2 Personnel
• 1.6 Weather and Tide
• 1.7 Cargo Hold Arrangement
• 1.7.1 Design
• 1.7.2 Water Detection
• 1.8 Cargo Hold Pumping
• 1.8.1 Bilge Pumping Arrangement
• 1.8.2 Sealing of Bilge Well Strainer Plates
• 1.8.3 Safety Management System - Pumping Procedures
• 1.9 Cargo Description
• 1.10 Other Occurrences
• 1.11 Electrical System
• 1.11.1 Power Plant and Distribution System
• 1.11.2 Circuit Breakers
• 1.11.3 Bus Bars
• 1.11.4 Regulatory Inspection of Switchboard
• 1.11.5 Aft Air Compressor Set
• 1.11.6 Harbour Generator
• 1.11.7 Vessel's Blackout Procedure
• 1.11.8 Marine Machinery Regulations
• 1.12 Emergency Plans
• 1.12.1 Company Plan
• 1.12.2 Vessel Plan
• 1.12.3 Company Proposed Salvage Plan
• 1.12.4 Emergency Preparedness of Agencies
• 1.12.4.1 Transport Canada
• 1.12.4.2 Department of Fisheries and Oceans
• 1.12.5 Submission/Approval of the Salvage Plan

2.0 Analysis

• 2.1 Cause of the Blackout
• 2.1.1 Short Circuit
• 2.1.2 Coordination of Electrical Protective Devices
• 2.2 Steering Gear
• 2.3 Awareness of Water in the Cargo Hold
• 2.4 Cargo Hold Pumping
• 2.5 Emergency Response Plans
• 2.5.1 Marine Emergency Response Plan - Company
• 2.5.2 Marine Emergency Response Plan - Vessel
• 2.5.3 Proposed Salvage Plan
• 2.5.4 Governmental Authorities

3.0 Conclusions

• 3.1 Findings as to Causes and Contributing Factors
• 3.2 Findings as to Risk
• 3.3 Other Findings

4.0 Safety Action

• 4.1 Action Taken
• 4.1.1 Coordination of Electrical Protection Devices and
            Switchboards
• 4.1.1.1 Steering Gear
• 4.1.2 Water Detection and Bilge Pumping Arrangement
• 4.1.3 Safety Management System - Procedures
• 4.1.4 Emergency Preparedness
• 4.2 Safety Concerns
• 4.2.1 Adequacy of Emergency Preparedness
• 4.2.2 Detection of Water Ingress

Appendices

• Appendix A - Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO)
                       Questions and Comments
• Appendix B - Excerpts from Transport Canada Quebec Region -
                       Marine Safety Response Guide
• Appendix C - List of Laboratory Reports
• Appendix D - Glossary

Photos

• Photo 1 - Canadian Leader
• Photo 2 - The Canadian Leader Aground off
                 Deschaillons-sur-Saint-Laurent
• Photo 3 - Water in the No. 2 Cargo Hold
• Photo 4 - Screen Bulkhead Drainage Opening
• Photo 5 - Strainer Plates in the Aft Port Cargo Hold
• Photo 6 - Port Bilge Well, with Strainer Plates Sealed Off
• Photo 7 - Side View of a Standard Arrangement of the Three
                 Vertical Bus Bars Resting in Bakelite Insulation and
                 Encased by the Steel Bracket
• Photo 8 - Steel Bracket, Horizontal Bakelite Insulation Block with
                 the Three Notches, Vertical 6 mm Flat Bakelite Insulation
                 Piece, and Bus Bar in the Centre Notch
• Photo 9 - View of the 6 mm "H"-Shaped Bakelite Insulation Piece
                 as Found on the Switchboard Deck
• Photo 10 - View from Above of Three Bus Bars, the Bakelite
                   Insulation Block, and Indication of Arcing in Way of
                   the Bus Bars
• Photo 11 - View from Above of Three Bus Bars, the Bakelite
                   Insulation Block, and Normal Location of the 6 mm Flat
                   Bakelite Insulation Piece (Insert)
• Photo 12 - End View of Bus Bars Showing Result of Arcing
• Photo 13 - View of Steel Bracket Showing Result of Arcing and
                   Bakelite Insulation Block
• Photo 14 - Air Compressor Arrangement Showing Electrical Motor
                   Between Two Compressors
• Photo 15 - Wire Terminal Covered with Electrical Tape, but
                   Showing Bare Screw
• Photo 16 - Contact Point on Inside Top of Connection Box

Figures

• Figure 1 - Grounding Position on the St. Lawrence River
• Figure 2 - Circuit Breaker Line Diagram

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