Transportation Safety Board
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  MARINE Reports - 2003 - M03N0050

Appendices

  1. Appendix A - Sketch of the Occurrence Area
  2. Appendix B - Outboard Profile
  3. Appendix C - Damage to Vehicles
  4. Appendix D - Glossary

Appendix A - Sketch of the Occurrence Area

Appendix A - Sketch of the Occurrence Area

Appendix B - Outboard Profile

Appendix B - Outboard Profile

Click to see larger image

Appendix C - Damage to Vehicles

Appendix C1  - Tractor fire damage

Tractor fire damage

Appendix C2 - Trailer fire damage

Trailer fire damage

Appendix C3 - Moving and storage trailer fire damage

Moving and storage trailer fire damage

Appendix C4 - Drop trailer fire damage

Drop trailer fire damage

Appendix C5 - Private motor vehicle heat damage

Private motor vehicle heat damage


Appendix D - Glossary

ECR emergency control room
EOW engineer of the watch
ERM Emergency Response Manual
ICCL International Council of Cruise Lines
IMO International Maritime Organization
ISM Code International Management Code for the Safe Operation of Ships and for Pollution Prevention
kPa kilopascals
kW kilowatts
LED light-emitting diode
m metres
m2 square metres
m3 cubic metres
MCR machinery control room
MED Marine Emergency Duties
mm millimetres
MSA Marine Safety Advisory
MSI Marine Safety Information
N north
NTSB National Transportation Safety Board (United States)
OOW officer of the watch
PA public address
PSD Passenger Service Department
psi pounds per square inch
ro-ro roll-on/roll-off
SCO senior chief officer
SCS senior chief steward
SI International System (of units)
SOLAS International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (IMO)
SSB Ship Safety Bulletin (Transport Canada)
STCW Convention International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers, 1978, as amended in 1995 (IMO)
TC Transport Canada
TP Transport Publication
TSB Transportation Safety Board of Canada
VDW vehicle deck watchman
VHF very high frequency
W west
º degrees
ºC degrees Celsius
' minutes

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1. Units of measurement in this report conform to International Maritime Organization (IMO) standards or, where there is no such standard, are expressed in the International System (SI) of units.

2. See Glossary at Appendix D for all abbreviations and acronyms.

3. Capacities given for vehicles refer to the total capacity where that type of vehicle only is being carried. Normally, a combination of vehicle types are on board. Crewing levels may vary according to passenger load as per the vessel's Ship Inspection Certificate.

4. A drop trailer is a stand-alone trailer with no tractor attached.

5. All times are Newfoundland daylight time (Coordinated Universal Time minus 2.5 hours).

6. The tractor-trailer where the fire is believed to have started was too badly damaged to be easily removed. It was finally towed off the vessel later in the morning.

7. A Convention vessel is one to which the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) applies; typically, a vessel operating on international voyages.

8. Under the Canada Shipping Act, ISM Code certification is not required for Canadian vessels that operate on non-Convention voyages.

9. Transport Canada, Ship Safety Bulletin 02/2004, Ship's Alarm and Internal Communication System, states that the maximum time delay is two minutes.

10. Fire Detection and Extinguishing Equipment Regulations, Canada Shipping Act

11. One bar is equivalent to 100 kPa or 14.5 psi.

12. This vehicle was carrying ammonium nitrate fertilizers, Class 5.1 (oxidizer), UN 2067. These substances will accelerate burning when involved in a fire and some may decompose explosively when heated.

13. Throughout Section 1.9 of this report, the terms "crew" and "crew member(s)" refer exclusively to employees of the Passenger Service Department, unless specifically stated otherwise.

14. Following the occurrence, the TSB was able to contact 98 of the 138 passengers who were on board at the time of the occurrence with a Passenger Safety Questionnaire. Of those mailings, 55 responses were received.

15. Twenty-four of the 36 PSD crew on board at the time of the occurrence had received this training.

16. Boat and Fire Drill Regulations, Canada Shipping Act

17. Some crew members were trained in these subject areas as a result of having worked on a vessel previously operated by Marine Atlantic that had undertaken Convention voyages.

18. Ship Safety Bulletin 02/1996, Passenger Safety Instructions, 17 January 1996

19. Ship Safety Bulletin 16/1999, Information on Passengers, 07 December 1999

20. Marine Atlantic Trip Traffic Count and Sailing Manifest

21. IMO, SOLAS, 1974, and its Protocol of 1988, Chapter II-1, Regulation 20-3

22. Marine Atlantic has since discovered that, even when properly locked, these doors can be forced open by anybody with the knowledge of how to do so.

23. The design of some vehicles (recreational vehicles, trucks equipped with sleeping accommodation, etc.) limits the vehicle deck watchmen's ability to determine whether or not a vehicle is occupied.

24. IMO, SOLAS, 1974, and its Protocol of 1988, Chapter II-2, Regulation 13.3.2.5

25. In 2002, Canadian ferry services transported 39 million passengers and 15.4 million vehicles (source: http://www.tc.gc.ca/pol/en/report/anre2003/toc_e.htm, accessed 15 August 2005).

26. Fire Detection and Extinguishing Equipment Regulations, Schedule II, Canada Shipping Act

27. NTSB Marine Accident Report MAR-98/02, fire on board the Panamanian passenger ship Universe Explorer in the Lynn Canal near Juneau, Alaska, 27 July 1996

  • NTSB Marine Accident Brief MAB/98-01 regarding fire on board the Bahamian-registered passenger ship Vistafjord, 06 April 1997
  • NTSB Marine Accident Brief Report MBR-01/01, fire on board the Netherlands-registered passenger ship Nieuw Amsterdam, Glacier Bay, Alaska, 23 May 2000

28. NTSB Safety Recommendations M-00-6 and M-00-7, dated 18 July 2000

29. ICCL Industry Standard S-4-01, Local Sounding Smoke Alarms, 06 November 2001

30. M. Edwards and E. Edwards, The Aircraft Cabin: Managing the Human Factors, Brookfield, Vermont: Gower, 1990, pp. 204-212

31. Transportation of Dangerous Goods Regulations, Transportation of Dangerous Goods Act

32. Dangerous Goods Shipping Regulations, Canada Shipping Act

33. The crew member who was unable to clear the locked cabin was required to return to deck 5 (from deck 7), report the anomaly and then return to the cabin a second time.

34. IMO, SOLAS, 1974, and its Protocol of 1988, Chapter II-2, Regulation 7.8.3

35. Throughout Section 2.3 of this report, the terms "crew" and "crew member(s)" refer exclusively to employees of the Passenger Service Department, unless specifically stated otherwise.

36. TSB reports M92W1022 and M92L3011, respectively

37. TSB report M90M4053

38. The requirements for training are specified in the Marine Certification Regulations and the Crewing Regulations. The corresponding course syllabuses are outlined in the Training Standards for RO-RO Passenger Ships Personnel (TP 13024) and the Marine Emergency Duties Training Programme (TP 4957).

39. As used here, "limited voyages" refers to voyages within the minor waters of Canada, as defined by the Canada Shipping Act, as well as ferries operating between terminals that are no more than seven miles apart.

40. IMO, MSC/Circular 699, Revised Guidelines for Passenger Safety Instructions, 17 July 1995

41. One ferry operator has adopted the policy of donning reflective vests and crew identification labels and requiring all crew in control of passengers to wear bright orange vests with reflective tape during emergency situations.

42. NTSB Marine Accident Report MAR-01/01, fire on board the Liberian passenger ship Ecstasy, Miami, Florida, 20 July 1998

43. NTSB Marine Accident Brief Report MBR-01/01, fire on board the Netherlands-registered passenger ship Nieuw Amsterdam, Glacier Bay, Alaska, 23 May 2000

44. IMO, SOLAS, Chapter III, Regulation 27

45. TSB occurrence M03W0073: Faced with similar circumstances following an engine room fire on board the BC Ferries vessel Queen of Surrey, the master immediately evacuated all passengers by foot once the ferry docked. Passengers were permitted to return and remove their vehicles after shore-based and ship-based personnel confirmed that the fire had been completely extinguished.