Transportation Safety Board of Canada
www.bst-tsb.gc.ca
REPORTS > MARINE > 2002 > M02W0135
Table of Contents
- 1.0 Factual Information
- 1.1 Particulars of the Vessel
- 1.1.1 Description of the Vessel
- 1.1.2 Engine Room
- 1.1.3 Main Switchboard and Main Switchboard Room
- 1.1.4 Engine Control Room
- 1.1.5 Structural Fire Protection Between Main Switchboard Room and Adjacent Compartments
- 1.1.6 6.6 kV Main Circuit Breaker
- 1.1.7 Automatic Control System for the Diesel Generators
- 1.2 History of the Voyage
- 1.3 Injuries to Persons
- 1.4 Damage
- 1.4.1 Damage to the Main Switchboard and Engine Control Room
- 1.4.2 Damage to the Environment
- 1.5 Personnel
- 1.6 Certification
- 1.6.1 Vessel
- 1.6.2 Personnel
- 1.7 ISM Code and the Statendam's Safety Management System
- 1.7.1 Rapid Reporting System
- 1.7.2 Initiatives Towards Blackout Prevention and Plant Recovery
- 1.7.3 Holland America Line's Personnel Training Initiatives
- 1.7.4 Emergency Preparedness and Firefighting
- 1.8 STCW Code, Certificates of Competency, and Knowledge of Electro-technology
- 1.9 Role of the Electrical Officer
- 2.0 Analysis
- 2.1 DG 2 Main Circuit Breaker Failure
- 2.1.1 Detailed Analysis of the DG 2 and Bus-Tie Circuit Breaker Trips
- 2.1.1.1 First Two DG 2 Shutdowns
- 2.1.1.2 First DG 2 Circuit Breaker Opening and its Resetting
- 2.1.1.3 Second DG 2 Circuit Breaker Opening and Subsequent Loss of Propulsion and Hotel Services
- 2.1.1.4 Attempts to Reset the Bus-Tie Breaker
- 2.1.1.5 Second DG 2 Circuit Breaker Resetting and its Subsequent Failure After Restart of DG 2
- 2.2 Engine-Room Staff and Analysis of the DG 2 Shutdowns and Circuit Breaker Trips
- 2.2.1 Actions of the Senior Engineers and the Electricians
- 2.3 Factors Affecting Performance
- 2.3.1 Senior Engineer Officers and their Knowledge of 6.6 kV Electrical Systems
- 2.3.2 Operational Pressures and Engineering Staff Decision Making
- 2.4 Safety Management System
- 2.4.1 Internal and External Communication
- 2.4.1.1 Engine-Room Management and Information Exchange Within the Vessel
- 2.4.1.2 Information Exchange Between the Vessel and the Company
- 2.4.2 Crew Training
- 2.4.3 Emergency Preparedness and Fire in the Main Switchboard Room
- 2.4.3.1 Firefighting Process
- 2.4.4 Performance of the Safety Management System
- 2.5 CO2 Smothering System and Main Switchboard Room
- 2.6 The Electrician in Modern Day Shipping
- 2.6.1 Marine Industry Practice of Employing Electricians
- 2.6.2 Dynamics of Decision Making and Safety
- 2.7 Structural Fire Protection
- 2.7.1 Between the Main Switchboard Room and Adjacent Compartments
- 3.0 Conclusions
- 3.1 Findings as to Causes and Contributing Factors
- 3.2 Findings as to Risk
- 4.0 Safety Action
- 4.1 Action Taken
- 4.1.1 Transportation Safety Board of Canada
- 4.1.2 Holland America Line
- 4.2 Action Required
- 4.2.1 Structural Fire Protection and Fire-Extinguishing System
- 4.3 Safety Concern
- 4.3.1 International Competency Standards for Electrical Officers
- 5.0 Appendices
- Appendix A - Main Circuit Breaker Electrical Characteristics
- Appendix B - Statendam - Speed versus Power
- Appendix C - Figures and Photos
- Appendix D - Glossary
- Figures
- Figure 1 - Fire Zones
- Figure 2 - Area of Interest
- Figure 3 - Spatial Relationship
- Figure 4 - Sectional View
- Photos
- Photo 1 - View of DG 2 Circuit Breaker and Relay Consoles
- Photo 2 - View of Burned Cabling Above Deck of Engine Control Room
- Photo 3 - View of Deckhead Above Main Switchboard
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