Transportation Safety Board of Canada
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  MARINE Reports - 2002 - M02W0135

Table of Contents

  1. 1.0 Factual Information
    1. 1.1 Particulars of the Vessel
    2. 1.1.1 Description of the Vessel
    3. 1.1.2 Engine Room
    4. 1.1.3 Main Switchboard and Main Switchboard Room
    5. 1.1.4 Engine Control Room
    6. 1.1.5 Structural Fire Protection Between Main Switchboard Room and Adjacent Compartments
    7. 1.1.6 6.6 kV Main Circuit Breaker
    8. 1.1.7 Automatic Control System for the Diesel Generators
    9. 1.2 History of the Voyage
    10. 1.3 Injuries to Persons
    11. 1.4 Damage
    12. 1.4.1 Damage to the Main Switchboard and Engine Control Room
    13. 1.4.2 Damage to the Environment
    14. 1.5 Personnel
    15. 1.6 Certification
    16. 1.6.1 Vessel
    17. 1.6.2 Personnel
    18. 1.7 ISM Code and the Statendam's Safety Management System
    19. 1.7.1 Rapid Reporting System
    20. 1.7.2 Initiatives Towards Blackout Prevention and Plant Recovery
    21. 1.7.3 Holland America Line's Personnel Training Initiatives
    22. 1.7.4 Emergency Preparedness and Firefighting
    23. 1.8 STCW Code, Certificates of Competency, and Knowledge of Electro-technology
    24. 1.9 Role of the Electrical Officer
  2. 2.0 Analysis
    1. 2.1 DG 2 Main Circuit Breaker Failure
    2. 2.1.1 Detailed Analysis of the DG 2 and Bus-Tie Circuit Breaker Trips
    3. 2.1.1.1 First Two DG 2 Shutdowns
    4. 2.1.1.2 First DG 2 Circuit Breaker Opening and its Resetting
    5. 2.1.1.3 Second DG 2 Circuit Breaker Opening and Subsequent Loss of Propulsion and Hotel Services
    6. 2.1.1.4 Attempts to Reset the Bus-Tie Breaker
    7. 2.1.1.5 Second DG 2 Circuit Breaker Resetting and its Subsequent Failure After Restart of DG 2
    8. 2.2 Engine-Room Staff and Analysis of the DG 2 Shutdowns and Circuit Breaker Trips
    9. 2.2.1 Actions of the Senior Engineers and the Electricians
    10. 2.3 Factors Affecting Performance
    11. 2.3.1 Senior Engineer Officers and their Knowledge of 6.6 kV Electrical Systems
    12. 2.3.2 Operational Pressures and Engineering Staff Decision Making
    13. 2.4 Safety Management System
    14. 2.4.1 Internal and External Communication
    15. 2.4.1.1 Engine-Room Management and Information Exchange Within the Vessel
    16. 2.4.1.2 Information Exchange Between the Vessel and the Company
    17. 2.4.2 Crew Training
    18. 2.4.3 Emergency Preparedness and Fire in the Main Switchboard Room
    19. 2.4.3.1 Firefighting Process
    20. 2.4.4 Performance of the Safety Management System
    21. 2.5 CO2 Smothering System and Main Switchboard Room
    22. 2.6 The Electrician in Modern Day Shipping
    23. 2.6.1 Marine Industry Practice of Employing Electricians
    24. 2.6.2 Dynamics of Decision Making and Safety
    25. 2.7 Structural Fire Protection
    26. 2.7.1 Between the Main Switchboard Room and Adjacent Compartments
  3. 3.0 Conclusions
    1. 3.1 Findings as to Causes and Contributing Factors
    2. 3.2 Findings as to Risk
  4. 4.0 Safety Action
    1. 4.1 Action Taken
    2. 4.1.1 Transportation Safety Board of Canada
    3. 4.1.2 Holland America Line
    4. 4.2 Action Required
    5. 4.2.1 Structural Fire Protection and Fire-Extinguishing System
    6. 4.3 Safety Concern
    7. 4.3.1 International Competency Standards for Electrical Officers
  5. 5.0 Appendices
    1. Appendix A - Main Circuit Breaker Electrical Characteristics
    2. Appendix B - Statendam - Speed versus Power
    3. Appendix C - Figures and Photos
    4. Appendix D - Glossary
  6. Figures
    1. Figure 1 - Fire Zones
    2. Figure 2 - Area of Interest
    3. Figure 3 - Spatial Relationship
    4. Figure 4 - Sectional View
  7. Photos
    1. Photo 1 - View of DG 2 Circuit Breaker and Relay Consoles
    2. Photo 2 - View of Burned Cabling Above Deck of Engine Control Room
    3. Photo 3 - View of Deckhead Above Main Switchboard

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