Publications
- Table of Contents
- 1
- 2
- 3
- 4
- 5
Departmental Performance Report
2.7 Marine Sector
2.7.1 Annual Statistics
In all, 480 marine accidents5 were reported to the TSB in 2005, a 2 per cent decrease from the 2004 total of 492 and a 7 per cent decrease from the 2000-2004 average of 514. Marine fatalities totalled 19 in 2005, down from both the 2004 total and the 2000-2004 average of 28.
Shipping accidents, which comprised 91 per cent of marine accidents, reached a 30-year low of 435 in 2005, down from 442 in 2004 and the five-year average of 456. Nearly half of all vessels involved in shipping accidents were fishing vessels. Accidents to persons aboard ship, which include falls, electrocution, and other types of injuries requiring hospitalization, totalled 45 in 2005, a 10 per cent decrease from the 2004 total of 50 and a 22 per cent decrease from the five-year average of 58.
Marine activity for Canadian commercial non-fishing vessels increased by 5 per cent from the 2000-2004 average, resulting in a 7 per cent decrease in the accident rate from 3.0 to 2.8 accidents per 1,000 movements. Although marine activity for foreign commercial non-fishing vessels remained relatively unchanged compared to the 2000-2004 average, accidents increased, yielding a 47 per cent increase in the accident rate from 1.5 to 2.2 accidents per 1,000 movements.
In 2005, shipping accidents resulted in 12 fatalities, down from 22 in 2004 and the five-year average of 17. Accidents aboard ship resulted in 7 fatalities, up 1 from the 2004 total but down 4 from the five-year average.
Twenty-two vessels were reported lost in 2005, equal to the 2004 total but down from the five-year average of 36.
In 2005, 224 marine incidents were reported to the TSB in accordance with the mandatory reporting requirements. This represents a 10 per cent decrease from the 2004 total of 248 but is comparable to the five-year average of 226.
One indicator of marine safety in Canada is the Canadian-flag shipping accident rate. This accident rate has decreased from 3.0 accidents per 1,000 movements in 2004 to 2.8 in 2005. However, this downward trend over the past 10 years is not statistically significant.
2.7.2 Investigations
In 2005-2006, 17 marine investigations were started and 12 investigations were completed. This represents an important decrease (from 21 to 12) of the number of investigations completed compared to 2004-2005. The decrease is linked to the decrease in the number of investigators during the current fiscal year. The average duration of completed investigations dropped to 651 days compared to 881 the year before and to 839 days between 2001-2002 and 2004-2005. This is attributable to the concentrated efforts made to complete older cases. A complete list of all marine reports released in 2005-2006 is available on the TSB website.
Table 9: Marine Productivity
| 2001- 2002 |
2002- 2003 |
2003- 2004 |
2004- 2005 |
2005- 2006 |
|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Investigations started | 16 | 13 | 14 | 16 | 17 |
| Investigations completed | 18 | 15 | 18 | 21 | 12 |
| Average duration of completed investigations (Number of Days) | 817 | 703 | 953 | 881 | 651 |
| Recommendations | 5 | 5 | 7 | 4 | 6 |
| Safety advisories | 12 | 7 | 6 | 9 | 5 |
| Safety information letters | 11 | 14 | 11 | 8 | 8 |
Note: Results can fluctuate significantly from year to year due to a number of factors such as staff turnover, the complexity of investigations and the investigation of major occurrences.
2.7.3 Link to Resources Utilized
Table 10 provides a picture of the net cost to Canadians of marine investigations. Although net costs dropped slightly compared to the previous year, the average net cost per investigation completed increased by 61 per cent because of different factors such as the expenditure associated with the major investigation undertook when the ferry Queen of the North sunk near Prince Rupert, British Columbia, the overtime worked to make up for a lack of investigators as well as the expenditure to implement a new work approach to speed up the investigations and the quality of the reports produced. The number of investigations started per investigator increased slightly, whereas the number of investigations completed per investigator decreased compared to 2004-2005.
Table 10: Marine Resources
| 2004-2005 | 2005-2006 | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| FTE | In thousands of dollars | FTE | In thousands of dollars | |
| Actual costs - Marine Branch | 27.3 | 2,975 | 22.9 | 2,797 |
| Internal professional and communication services costs | 19.2 | 2,115 | 17.7 | 1,823 |
| Corporate Services costs | 13.6 | 1,291 | 10.7 | 1,196 |
| Contributions to employee benefit plans | 803 | 781 | ||
| Services received without charge | 747 | 696 | ||
| Net cost of Marine investigations | 60.1 | 7,931 | 51.3 | 7,294 |
| Indicators | 2004-2005 | 2005-2006 |
|---|---|---|
| Number of Marine Investigators | 23 | 20.4 |
| Average net cost per investigation completed | $377,670 | $607,820 |
| Investigations started per investigator | 0.70 | 0.83 |
| Investigations completed per investigator | 0.91 | 0.59 |
2.7.4 Safety Actions Taken
Six marine safety recommendations were issued in 2005-2006. To date, safety actions have been undertaken on three of these recommendations and actions will be taken on the three other recommendations in the coming year.
The Marine Branch also re-assessed responses to published recommendations. In 2005, 57 active recommendations were examined. With Board approval, 20 recommendations went from active to inactive status and 37 recommendations remained active. Five recommendations issued subsequent to the Board's approval of the re-assessments were not included in the assessment.
2.7.4.1 Marine Recommendations Issued in 2004-2005
Report No. M02W0135: Strait of Georgia, British Columbia - 4 August 2002
Switchboard Fire - Passenger Vessel Statendam
| RECOMMENDATION | RESPONSE | BOARD ASSESSMENT OF RESPONSE | SAFETY ACTION TAKEN |
|---|---|---|---|
| M05-01 | |||
| The Department of Transport submit a paper to the International Maritime Organization requesting a review of requirements for structural fire protection and fire-extinguishing systems to ensure that the fire risks associated with compartments containing high levels of electrical energy are adequately assessed, and that the provisions of the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) dealing with structural fire protection and fixed fire-extinguishing systems are addressed. | Transport Canada (TC) believes that the TSB should prepare an information paper on the issue and TC would submit it to the International Maritime Organization (IMO) Fire Protection Sub Committee at the next meeting in January 2006. | Fully Satisfactory | TC agreed to submit an information paper (as drafted by TSB staff) to the IMO Fire Protection Sub Committee that will call for a review to ensure that the fire risks associated with compartments containing high levels of electrical energy are adequately assessed and addressed by the provisions of SOLAS. The paper, dated 4 October 2005, was submitted to the IMO. |
Report No. M03M0077: Off Petit-de-Grat, Nova Scotia - 25 June 2003
Fire and Sinking - Small Fishing Vessel Silent Provider
| RECOMMENDATION | RESPONSE | BOARD ASSESSMENT OF RESPONSE | SAFETY ACTION TAKEN |
|---|---|---|---|
| M05-02 | |||
| The Department of Transport, in conjunction with the manufacturer, ensure that all present and future owners of Ovatek liferafts receive information that will allow users to properly de-water and right a swamped liferaft and encourage all users to practice these procedures. | The Minister of Transport accepts the recommendation. TC is working with the manufacturer to ensure that information on de watering is provided to all current and future owners of Ovatek liferafts. As part of the revisions to the Marine Emergency Duties Training Program and Marine Emergency Duties A3/A4 courses, TC will introduce special training, where applicable, concerning the boarding of a rigid liferaft. |
Satisfactory Intent | TC is to follow up with the manufacturer in early March 2006 before the commencement of the 2006 fishing season to confirm that the proposed actions have been completed. The revisions to training are to be implemented with the new proposed Marine Personnel Regulations in November 2006. |
| M05-03 | |||
| The Department of Transport develop and implement performance-based standards to ensure that all liferafts deployed on Canadian vessels are capable of operating in severe marine conditions and, further, encourage the International Maritime Organization to adopt a parallel approach internationally. | The Minister of Transport notes the recommendation, and TC will continue to work with the IMO to improve the testing and performance criteria of all survival equipment. Currently, work at the IMO is focused on improving the testing criteria for lifeboats and release mechanisms, as this has been a concern internationally and domestically. TC is planning to carry out research regarding thermal requirements of liferafts. The current IMO standards specify a need for insulated floors and canopies in liferafts without specifying the value of thermal protection required. This research will assist in improving the performance criteria of liferafts. |
Satisfactory in Part | There is no indication in the response of any other domestic initiative under consideration or being taken regarding liferaft-related testing and performance criteria for operating in more severe marine conditions. However, TC is working at the international level through the IMO to further improve the testing and performance criteria of survival equipment. The development of goal- or performance-based standards is well under way within the IMO to address a variety of maritime matters. A correspondence group of the IMO Sub-Committee on Ship Design and Equipment (48th session, 21-25 February 2006) is expected to prepare performance requirements for survival craft used on future passenger ships. |
Report No. M04N0086: Off Cape Bonavista, Newfoundland and Labrador -
19 September 2004
Capsizing and Loss of Life - Small Fishing Vessel Ryan's Commander
| RECOMMENDATION | RESPONSE | BOARD ASSESSMENT OF RESPONSE | SAFETY ACTION TAKEN |
|---|---|---|---|
| M05-04 | |||
| The Department of Transport ensure that the Board's previous recommendations M03-05 and M03-06 are immediately implemented. | Until such time as the new Fishing Vessel Safety Regulations come into force, TC has established an interim measure for determining, based on a list of risk factors, whether a small fishing vessel requires a stability booklet. This interim measure, which will take effect immediately and apply to new and existing vessels, will require that a stability booklet be on board all vessels that have any of the identified risk factors. | Pending | To be reported next fiscal year |
Report No. M03W0073: Queen Charlotte Channel, British Columbia -
12 May 2003
Engine Room Fire and Subsequent Failure of the CO2 Distribution Manifold - Ro-Ro Passenger Ferry Queen of Surrey
| RECOMMENDATION | RESPONSE | BOARD ASSESSMENT OF RESPONSE | SAFETY ACTION TAKEN |
|---|---|---|---|
| M05-05 | |||
| The Department of Transport, in conjunction with other stakeholders, review Canadian and international marine regulations respecting fixed fire-extinguishing systems to ensure that their design, maintenance, inspection, and testing regimes effectively demonstrate continued structural and functional integrity. | Awaiting response | Pending | To be reported next fiscal year |
| M05-06 | |||
| The Department of Transport require Canadian passenger vessels over 500 gross tonnage to meet a standard of structural fire protection that ensures a level of safety equivalent to SOLAS-compliant vessels. | Awaiting response | Pending | To be reported next fiscal year |
2.7.4.2 Other Marine Safety Actions Taken
Transport Canada (TC) issued Ship Safety Bulletin 01/2005, The Use of Passive Anti-Roll Tanks (ART) on Small Fishing Vessels, to caution operators of vessels fitted with passive anti-roll tanks about the safety hazards associated with their use.
The Canadian General Standards Board published its amended standard CAN/CGSB-65.16-2005, Immersion Suit Systems. The amended standard requires that information concerning the donning, fitting, operation, maintenance and cleaning of the suit system be made available to purchasers at the point of sale.
A West Coast marine insurance company advised its members of the potential deficiencies associated with the use of single crossbar type hatch covers.
TC completed special audits with respect to operational readiness on board some passenger ferries operating in Canada.
TC is reviewing all fire safety regulatory requirements, together with other international standards. Low-location lighting, emergency lighting and supplemental lighting requirements will be included in the review. TC anticipates that the new Fire Safety Regulations will come into force by November 2006.
The ferry operator Northumberland Ferries Ltd. made modifications to the control levers of a horizontal sliding door to make the operation of the door easier; the lever now actuates the door in the same direction of travel and the handles are now very close to the door opening. The time required for the horizontal watertight door to close from fully opened was also adjusted to 26 to 30 seconds as per the manufacturer's specifications.
The Canadian Coast Guard issued Fleet Bulletin 06-2005, Concerns about Stability of Aluminum Barges, to its fleet personnel to remind them to give careful consideration to the impact of cargo handling work on stability and the operating restrictions of barges.
2.8 Pipeline Sector
2.8.1 Annual Statistics
In 2005, 5 pipeline accidents were reported to the TSB, down from the 2004 total of 7 and from the 2000-2004 average of 16. Pipeline activity is estimated to have decreased by 1 per cent from the previous year. The accident rate decreased to 0.4 pipeline accidents per exajoule in 2005, down from 0.5 in 2004 and the 2000-2004 average rate of 1.48. The last fatal pipeline accident in the portion of the industry under federal jurisdiction occurred in 1988, and the last accident involving serious injury occurred in 2000.
In 2005, 79 pipeline incidents were reported to the TSB in accordance with the mandatory reporting requirements, up from 74 in 2004 and from the five-year average of 44. In all, 90 per cent of those incidents involved uncontained or uncontrolled release of small quantities of gas, oil and high-vapour-pressure products.
One indicator of pipeline transportation safety in Canada is the pipeline accident rate. This rate decreased to 0.4 pipeline accidents per exajoule in 2005, down from 0.5 in 2004 and the 2000-2004 average of 1.48. The trend line also indicates a clear downward direction.
2.8.2 Investigations
In 2005-2006, two pipeline investigations were started and one investigation was completed. The completed investigation required 922 days. This duration appears high if it is compared to the average investigation time in 2001-2002 and 2002-2003. However, the investigation was very complex and required a high degree of effort to gather and analyze the data. The pipeline report released in 2005-2006 is available on the TSB website.
Table 11: Pipeline Productivity
| 2001- 2002 |
2002- 2003 |
2003- 2004 |
2004- 2005 |
2005- 2006 |
|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Investigations started | 1 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 2 |
| Investigations completed | 3 | 2 | 0 | 2 | 1 |
| Average duration of completed investigations (Number of Days) | 531 | 410 | 0 | 1,081 | 922 |
| Recommendations | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Safety advisories | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Safety information letters | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Note: Results can fluctuate significantly from year to year due to a number of factors such as staff turnover, the complexity of investigations and the investigation of major occurrences. | |||||
2.8.3 Link to Resources Utilized
Table 12 provides a picture of the net cost to Canadians of pipeline investigations. The net cost of pipeline investigations increased slightly compared to 2004-2005. The average net cost per investigation undertaken increased by 101 per cent compared to 2004-2005. This high cost can be attributed to the complexity of the investigation that was completed and the need to use outside expertise to complete some components. This situation also explains the drop in the number of investigations completed per investigator compared to 2004-2005.
Table 12: Pipeline Resources
| 2004-2005 | 2005-2006 | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| FTE | In thousands of dollars | FTE | In thousands of dollars | |
| Actual costs - Pipeline Branch | 1.0 | 198 | 2.0 | 203 |
| Internal professional and communication services costs | 0.7 | 141 | 1.5 | 133 |
| Corporate Services costss | 0.5 | 86 | 0.9 | 87 |
| Contributions to employee benefit plans | 53 | 57 | ||
| Services received without charge | 50 | 51 | ||
| Net cost of Pipeline investigations | 2.2 | 528 | 4.4 | 531 |
| Indicators | 2004-2005 | 2005-2006 |
|---|---|---|
| Number of Pipeline investigators | 1.0 | 1.8 |
| Average net cost per investigation completed | $263,913 | $530,584 |
| Investigations started per investigator | 0.00 | 1.11 |
| Investigations completed per investigator | 2.00 | 0.56 |
2.8.4 Safety Actions Taken
No pipeline safety recommendations were issued in 2005-2006.
- Date modified:
