Marine Reflexions Magazine

Issue 19, January 2002

Marine Occurrence Statistics

		2001 (Jan.-Nov.)	2000	1999	1995-1999 Average
Accidents		486	525	602	632
Accidents aboard ship		59	76	69	60
Shipping Accidents		427	449	533	571
	Collision	12	16	23	19
	Capsizing	7	15	6	17
	Foundering/Sinking	34	38	32	39
	Fire/Explosion	39	64	70	78
	Grounding	106	124	146	140
	Striking	84	68	82	96
	Ice damage	4	6	10	16
	Propeller/Rudder/Structural damage	18	32	40	41
	Flooding	66	50	65	68
	Other	18	36	59	57
Incidents		234	243	179	166
	Close-quarters situation	60	57	35	42
	Engine/Rudder/Propeller	95	101	74	63
	Cargo trouble	3	5	1	7
	Personal incidents	8	7	5	5
	Other	68	73	64	49
Vessels Involved in Shipping Accidents		466	489	578	623
	Cargo	29	24	25	26
	Bulk carrier/OBO	52	59	72	83
	Tanker	13	14	14	17
	Tug	33	33	42	44
	Barge	19	30	35	37
	Ferry	22	24	22	22
	Passenger	16	20	19	20
	Fishing	232	239	280	313
	Service vessel	26	23	35	30
	Non-commercial	16	13	14	18
	Other	8	10	20	13
By Vessel Flag
	Canadian (Non-fishing)	175	174	219	222
	Canadian (Fishing)	219	228	273	301
	Foreign	72	87	86	100
Vessels Lost		37	28	45	59
	1600 grt and over	0	0	1	1
	150 to 1599 grt	2	1	1	1
	60 to 149 grt	2	1	3	3
	15 to 59 grt	12	11	7	17
	Less than 15 grt	12	12	21	22
	Unknown tonnage	5	4	8	11
Fatalities		30	31	29	33
	Accidents Aboard Ship	13	15	15	12
	Shipping Accidents	17	16	14	21
Injuries		59	87	80	79
	Accidents Aboard Ship	8	70	61	55
	Shipping Accidents	51	17	19	25

Figures are preliminary as of 12 December 2001.
All five-year averages have been rounded. Totals sometimes do not coincide to the sum of averages.

Summaries

The following summaries highlight pertinent safety information from TSB reports on these investigations.

Ferry Boarding Fatality

On 09 July 1996, the 6122-gross-ton ferry Camille Marcoux was docked at the ferry wharf at Baie-Comeau, Quebec. Passengers and vehicles used the same loading ramp to proceed to the parking deck.
- Report No. M96L0069

During the final stages of loading vehicles on the parking deck, a tow truck towing a cement mixer moved onto the apron leading to the parking deck. After parking the cement mixer, the tow truck, guided in the confined space by only one signaller (positioned in front), backed up toward the wharf. The crew did not require the tow truck to turn around on the parking deck before proceeding to the loading ramp. Repeated warnings by the loading ramp attendant and others near the ramp failed to attract the attention of a passenger walking on the loading ramp toward the exit. The man, who had been walking with his back to the tow truck, was struck and transported to the local hospital, where he was pronounced dead on arrival.

The Board determined that the victim was struck because access was not closed to vehicles while passengers were walking on the loading ramp, and no signaller was positioned at the rear of the tow truck to guide it while backing up. Contributing to this occurrence was the lack of an automatic backing-up alarm on the tow truck. Since 1988, coroners in Quebec had made recommendations to the organizations concerned to take action to prevent this type of accident, but nothing had been done as of this occurrence. Despite the many recommendations to the Socit de l'assurance automobile du Qubec that backing-up alarms should be made mandatory on heavy trucks, the Quebec Highway Safety Code contained no provisions to that effect.

Local Action

In 1997, the Socit des traversiers du Qubec made improvements to the passenger embarkation facilities at the Matane and Baie-Comeau terminals. Improvements included a covered walkway and a completely separate boarding ramp for safer boarding of pedestrians. Following this occurrence, the owner of the tow truck installed a backing-up alarm on the vehicle.

Colregs Disregarded

At approximately 1200 eastern daylight time on 09 September 1997, in clear weather, the 129-gross-ton fishing vessel Navegante and the 121-gross-ton fishing vessel Teresa Maria were near S.E. Shoal in Lake Erie, bound for Wheatley, Ontario.
- Report No. M97C0057

Both vessels were on converging courses. The Navegante was steering 010 (T) at 11 knots, and the Teresa Maria was steering 000 (T) at 10 knots. Both vessels were on automatic steering and were crossing the main shipping channel near S.E. Shoal. No other shipping traffic was in the area at the time. Visibility was several miles, and each vessel was visible to the other. The relative bearing between the vessels remained almost constant, and as the distance between the vessels decreased, neither vessel altered course or reduced speed. At 1230, when the vessels were an estimated 15 to 25 m apart and nearly abeam of each other, the Navegante suddenly veered to starboard. About three to five seconds later, the bow struck the port side of the Teresa Maria, amidships, at an estimated angle of 45. After the collision, the two vessels were briefly locked together and stopped in the water. One person on the Teresa Maria suffered a minor injury. Both vessels were lightly damaged.

The Operators

The operator of the Teresa Maria was uncertificated and was acting as master while the regular master was on vacation. He had been doing this for several weeks each year for the last 10 years. He had been working in the Lake Erie fishing trade for approximately 15 years and had a good command of the English language.

The operator of the Navegante was new to the vessel, having been transferred to the Navegante from another vessel of the same company. After initial training given over two weeks, this was his first time navigating the vessel alone without the assistance of the master, whom he had relieved for lunch. He had been engaged in the Lake Erie fishery for about 11 years. During the investigation, he maintained that he did not speak English or French and required a Portuguese translator when interviewed. However, in 1988 he was issued a Canadian Fishing Master Class IV Certificate. Two of the prerequisites for obtaining this certificate were a fundamental understanding of the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (Colregs, Rules of the Road) and a Radio-telephone Operator's Restricted (Maritime) Certificate (RORC). A candidate for an RORC is required to demonstrate a working knowledge of either English or French.

The investigation determined that the vessels collided because the hydrodynamic interaction between them caused the Navegante to sheer to starboard and collide with the Teresa Maria when both were proceeding on near-parallel courses, at speed, and in close proximity to each other. The Navegante, being the overtaking and give-way vessel, did not give way, and the Teresa Maria, when it became apparent that the development of a close-quarters situation could not be avoided, did not take action to avoid collision. The vessels did not change steering mode from automatic to manual-to reduce rudder response time-until after they had collided. A lack of inter-ship communication and the operators' level of training and knowledge of the Rules of the Road also contributed to the accident. Although both operators claimed a good understanding of the Colregs, neither implemented the appropriate course of action specified in "Part B-Steering and Sailing Rules".

Reflexion

On a clear summer's day, with visibility of several miles, two vessels collide in open waters-unbelievable!

Colregs - Again!!

On 23 June 1997, at about 2215 eastern daylight time, the 48-gross-ton fishing vessel Frdric C was returning to Grande-Rivire, Quebec, from the fishing grounds. A fisherman's helper had just taken over the watch. The vessel was on autopilot.
- Report No. M97L0053

A short time later, he noticed two targets to starboard on the radar screen, but they did not appear to interfere with the course of his vessel. Then, a third target appeared on the radar screen at a distance of about three nautical miles to port; however, he did not consider it necessary to place the radar's cursor on the target. He glanced from time to time at the radar screen to observe the progress of the targets but did not follow them closely. He made most of his observations visually rather than by radar and could now make out the green sidelight of the third target. He continued his observations, alternating between the target to port and the two targets to starboard. When he went to glance again at the target to port, he had difficulty locating it visually. Suddenly, he saw reflections of lights followed by the bow of the other vessel striking the port side of the Frdric C. Part of the space containing the latrines and the exhaust piping was dislodged by the impact of the collision.

The other vessel, the 61-gross-ton fishing vessel Nicole Claude, had departed Newport at 2030 for the fishing grounds east of Bradelle Bank. At about 2230, the fisherman's helper who was on watch noticed the red sidelight of a vessel to starboard, which he estimated to be a mile away and which appeared to be keeping a constant course and speed. After a few moments, he decided to make a first course alteration of five degrees to starboard using the autopilot control. He then made a second course alteration of ten degrees to starboard. To attract attention and to prompt the other vessel to take action, he switched on the working lights on the main deck. Despite the alterations of course to avoid collision, the Nicole Claude struck the Frdric C at about 2250. The combined speed of both vessels at the time of the collision was estimated to have been about 19 knots.

Under the force of the impact, part of the port bow of the Nicole Claude was torn away, leaving a gaping hole in the crew's quarters. Flooding occurred so quickly that the crew had barely enough time to escape from the damaged section. The vessel eventually sank, and the crew were taken to Grande-Rivire by the Frdric C.

Some Things That Went Wrong

Instead of making large alterations of course, which would be readily apparent to another vessel observing visually or by radar, the Nicole Claude made a succession of small course alterations that were insufficient to be noticed and too late to be effective. The Frdric C kept its course and speed while a dangerous situation was developing ahead. Both vessels were on automatic steering as they approached each other instead of being steered manually so as to execute promptly any required changes of heading. Despite the availability of communications equipment on both vessels, neither sought to communicate their respective intentions to avoid collision.

Training

The fisherman's helpers on watch at the time of the collision had never received any formal training in the use of charts or in safe navigation. They did not hold certificates of competency, nor were they required to by current regulations. Professional fishermen who do not have training in safe navigation are nevertheless faced with this responsibility when they are in charge of the watch on the bridge. A lack of training in the use of radar and the interpretation of targets and a lack of knowledge of the Collision Regulations contributed to the collision.

Ongoing Actions

Transport Canada (TC) has modified the Crewing Regulations to require a certificated master or mate on board vessels greater than 60 gross registered tons. However, the amended regulations do not apply to vessels the size of the Frdric C.

Since the occurrence, the government of Quebec has passed a law and implemented regulations to ensure that every fisherman and fisherman's helper receives the appropriate training and apprenticeship at sea, leading to a professional status in fishing. The status is validated by a certificate. Furthermore, a book to contain information on the holder's continuous proficiency will also be issued and will be mandatory to practice commercial fishing in Quebec.

At present, Newfoundland fish harvesters are issued a certificate of designation under the Professional Fish Harvesters Act on a voluntary basis. Existing fish harvesters were classified to the appropriate level in 1997 based on their dependence on the industry for income. In addition, TC Marine Safety has recently negotiated an agreement with the industry for a commitment to further reduce the vessel tonnage required for the carriage of a certificated master on fishing vessels.

Alone on the Bridge in Fog

On 08 September 1997, at 0550 Pacific daylight time, the second mate of the 9518-gross-ton log carrier Haida Monarch relieved the chief mate and took over as officer of the watch (OOW). The vessel was abeam of Dupont Island in Caamao Sound, British Columbia.
- Report No. M97W0186

While passing through the sound, the vessel encountered several fog patches. The OOW notified the engine room to have the engines on standby, posted a lookout, and began sounding the appropriate fog signals. At 0625, the vessel encountered another fog patch, and the visibility decreased sharply. At 0630, the vessel passed Ulric Point and entered Laredo Channel where the visibility improved. The OOW regularly checked and plotted the vessel's position using radar bearings and distances. At 0710, a fix of Shotbolt Point was plotted and recorded in the logbook as the vessel entered a fog bank; the visibility was reduced to one cable (0.1 nautical mile) or less.

A 10 course alteration to starboard was planned off Ramsbotham Island, approximately four nautical miles from the 0710 position along the plotted course line of 137. In preparation for the course alteration, the OOW was parallel-indexing off Shotbolt Point and checking the vessel's progress on the radar.

At 0720, the OOW took a radar bearing and distance abaft the starboard beam. Assuming that this was Ramsbotham Island, he plotted and marked it "0720". Because the fix fell on the intended course alteration position, he ordered the new course of 146 to be steered. At about 0730, both the helmsman and the OOW noticed an unidentified object that looked like a rock with a breaking wave dead ahead. The OOW immediately reversed the engines, but this failed to prevent the vessel from grounding. At 0735, the OOW stopped the engines and entered "Vessel Aground" in the logbook. The Haida Monarch sustained extensive bottom damage forward.

Grounding

The OOW acknowledged that he had mistaken Louis Island for Ramsbotham Island and had plotted an incorrect position of the vessel at 0720. Consequently, the course alteration ordered, based on the incorrect assumption, was made too early and resulted in the grounding.

Bridge Resource Management

The Master's Standing Orders included the following requirement: "2. Periods of Restricted Visibility the Regulation Sound Signals shall be used. Have engines on S/B, post look-out & call me if necessary." This and one other order were conditional; the other orders were absolute, ex. "5. ...fire... call me immediately" or "18. If any doubt whatsoever, call me."

The OOW followed these orders faithfully, except for calling the master. The OOW believed from experience that the master would not come to the wheelhouse because the master did not consider restricted visibility as a sufficient reason for him to be called. The working relationship between the OOW and the master was ineffective and was not based on bridge resource management principles. The breakdown in communications resulted in the OOW not calling the master during a difficult period of navigation.

Explosive Vapours

The seven-gross-ton fishing vessel Sha 122 was moored, second from the dock, in a row of four vessels at the floating dock on the east side of the jetty at the Comox, British Columbia, Small Craft Harbour.
- Report No. M97W0044

On the afternoon of 23 March 1997, the operator returned to the vessel after an absence of 48 hours, during which the vessel was unattended. Intending to sail to Prince Rupert, he boarded the vessel and opened the gasoline tank valves. He then went forward to start the engines. The operator had run the vessel this way since his appointment two months earlier and noticed nothing unusual that afternoon.

Though required by the Small Fishing Vessel Inspection Regulations, a forced ventilation system was not installed in the vessel's engine compartment and the void space where the fuel tanks were located. Consequently, any build-up of gasoline vapours could not be vented before starting the engines. Also, the forward bulkhead of the engine compartment was neither watertight nor gastight, and a gasoline leak, in either space, could affect both spaces. The owners were unaware of the regulatory requirement and relied on the fact that the vessel had been operating in this way before their purchase of it.

When the operator started the port engine, an explosion occurred, followed by a large gasolinefuelled fire. The force of the explosion ejected the operator from the Sha 122, and he landed on the deck of another vessel. A piece of canvas that wrapped around him before he was ejected saved him from being burned; however, he suffered a shrapnel wound to his knee. The Sha 122 was extensively damaged and was declared a constructive total loss.

Crew members from other vessels at the dock moved their boats away from the burning vessel and freed it from the berth. A Department of Fisheries and Oceans patrol vessel and the Comox Fire Department participated in fighting the fire.

The foremost concern was to keep the fiercely burning Sha 122 away from the wooden wharf fitted with jet fuel lines, running from the shore to the Department of National Defence (DND) fuel wharf. The southeasterly wind tried to push the vessel downwind onto the wharf, which had no boom or restraining chain to protect it from vessels either drifting or driven down onto it from the southeast. The exposed jet fuel lines on the east side of the wharf were also in danger of being fractured or gashed by vessels at high tide. Two freestanding piles east of the wooden wharf could be used to hold a floating boom or chains.

The investigation determined that the fire was most likely caused by gasoline fuel in the void space or engine compartment that ignited when the port engine starter was engaged. The lack of forced ventilation in the void spaces and the engine compartment prevented the operator from properly purging any gasoline vapours from the spaces before starting the engines.

Remedial Action

The harbour master of the Comox Small Craft Harbour requested that a floating boom be installed to prevent any vessel from contacting the wooden wharf. This request was acted upon, and a floating boom now protects the jet fuel lines on the DND wharf.

Reflexion

When purchasing vessels, and especially where safety is concerned, this accident brings to mind the adage "forewarned is forearmed".

Investigations

The following is preliminary information on all the occurrences under investigation by the TSB that were reported between 01 January 2000 and 30 September 2001. Final determination of events is subject to the TSB's full investigation of these occurrences.

Date	Location	Vessel (s)	Type	GRT	Event	Occurrence No.
January 2000 15	N. arm of Fraser River, B.C.	T.L. Sharpe Sea Cap XII	Barge Tug	356 52	Striking	M00W0005
March 13	Port Alberni, B.C.	C-Joy	Fishing	15	Accident on board	M00W0059
18	Off St. Anthony, Nfld.	BCM Atlantic	Fishing	878	Striking and sinking	M00N0009
28	Seaforth Channel, B.C.	Lori Cathlynn	Fishing	37	Capsizing	M00W0044
April 11	Off Godbout, Que.	Millenium Yama	Bulk carrier	14 038	Main engine failure	M00L0034
27	Sorel, Que.	Tecam Sea Federal Fuji	Bulk carrier Bulk carrier	17 056 17 814	Striking	M00L0039
May 12	Ottawa River, Hull, Que.	Miss Gatineau	Passenger	52	Fall overboard	M00L0043
18	Lake Saint Francis, Que.	Sunny Blossom	Tanker	11 598	Grounding	M00C0019
June 01	Bruce Mines, Ont.	Algowood	Bulk carrier	22 558	Structural failure	M00C0026
16	Georgian Bay, Ont.	True North II	Passenger	6	Sinking	M00C0033
August 10	Amherstburg Channel, Ont.	Algoeast	Tanker	8 545	Bottom contact	M00C0053
14	Country Harbour, N.S.	Mersey Venture	Fishing	2 337	Accident on board	M00M0083
25	W. shore of Hudson Bay	Avataq	Fishing	29	Foundering	M00H0008
September 06	Fraser River, B.C	Star Queen	Fishing	n/a	Accident on board	M00W0230
14	Swartz Bay, B.C	Star Ruby Spirit of Vancouver Island	Yacht Ferry	16 18 747	Collision	M00W0220
25	Lake Erie, Ont.	Griffon Atlantic Huron	Buoy tender/resupply Cargo	2 212 23 355	Striking	M00C0069
October 01	Off Yarmouth, N.S.	Flying Swan VI	Fishing	63	Capsizing	M00M0104
02	Liverpool, N.S.	Keta V	Tug	236	Grouding and sinking	M00M0106
08	Off Twillingate, Nfld.	no name	Fishing	n/a	Foundering	M00N0089
18	Off Cap Martin, Que.	Fossnes	Bulk Carrier	11 542	Grounding	M00L0114
26	Vancouver, B.C.	Pacmonarch	Bulk Carrier	38 878	Accident on board	M00W0265
31	Off Nain, Labrador	Mokami	Tanker	3 015	Grounding	M00N0098
December 18	Port of Saint John, N.B.	Severn Irving Primrose	Tanker Tanker	18 023 163 720	Contact	M00M0136
18	Port Coquitlam, B.C.	Miller 201	Barge	849	Striking	M00W0303
January 2001 09	Vancouver, B.C.	Alligator Victory	Container	42 809	Accident on board	M01W0006
February 03	Off Halifax N.S.	Thebaud Sea	Offshore supply	2 594	Fire	M01M0005
March 22	Off Chebucto Head, N.S.	Kitano	Container	50 618	Fire	M01M0017
April 01	Hamilton Harbour, Ont.	Utviken Hamilton Energy Provmar Terminal	Bulk carrier Tanker Tanker	17 460 982 4 947	Striking	M01C0008
18	Off Belle Isle , Nfld.	Fame	Fishing	1 025	Abandonment and sinking	M01N0020
May 14	Off Goderich, Ont.	Canadian Transfer	Bulk carrier	16 353	Bottom contact	M01C0019
June 13	Wascana Lake, Sask.	Wascana II	Ferry	n/a	Taking water	M01W0116
15	Lake Winnipeg, Man.	Shannon Dawn Rachel M	Fishing Fishing	n/a n/a	Swamping	M01C0029
June 30	Ottawa River, Ottawa, Ont.	Lady Duck	Amphibious	n/a	Taking on water and sinking	M01C0033
July 29	Contrecoeur, Que.	Cast Privilege	Container	26 383	Grounding	M01L0080
August 11	Welland Canal, Ont.	Windoc	Bulk carrier	18 517	Striking	M01C0054
22	Sault Ste. Marie, Ont.	Coral Trader PML 2501 Adanac III	Tanker Barge Tug	4 143 1 954 108	Striking	M01C0059
September 05	Baie Sainte- Anne, N.B.	Alain Jose	Fishing	13	Abandonment and sinking	M01M0100

Final Reports

The following investigation reports were approved between 01 January 2000 and 30 September 2001.

Date	Vessel(s)	Event	Report No.
97-04-17 97-04-18	Venus	Groundings	M97L0030
97-08-07	Navimar V	Overturning	M97L0076
97-11-03	Atlantic Erie	Fall from pilot ladder	M97M0141
98-02-03	Cape Chidley	Accident on board	M98M0003
98-03-22	Ocean Thunder	Swamping	M98W0045
98-04-02	Enerchem Refiner	Grounding	M98C0004
98-04-10	Agawa Canyon, Emerald Star	Collision	M98F0039
98-06-10	Saute Moutons 6	Accident on board	M98C0026
98-06-11	Grant Carrier	Bottom contact	M98C0015
98-08-29	Seaflight I	Collision	M98F0023
98-09-04	Incat 046, Lady Megan II	Collision	M98M0061
98-10-14	Algolake	Grounding	M98C0066
98-10-22	no name	Capsizing	M98M0078
98-10-26	Southgate	Fire	M98L0139
98-11-06	Atlantic Prize	Foundering	M98N0064
98-11-09	Iolcos Grace	Accident on board	M98W0245
98-11-27	Brier Mist	Swamping and sinking	M98L0149
98-12-12	Federal Bergen	Striking	M98C0082
98-12-24	Jade Star	Grounding	M98L0165
99-01-27	Canmar Spirit	Compressor bursting	M99L0011
99-03-01	Westisle	Near-capsizing	M99W0033
99-04-05	Paterson	Grounding	M99C0003
99-04-05	Algontario	Grounding	M99C0005
99-04-09	Cape Acacia	Striking bottom	M99W0058
99-05-13	Canadian Empress	Bottom contact	M99C0016
99-06-03	Hope I	Grounding	M99C0019
99-06-09	Algobay	Striking	M99F0042
99-06-09	Bluenose II	Grounding	M99M0062
99-06-16	Alam Selamat	Bottom contact	M99W0087
99-07-12	Flip	Capsizing	M99W0137
99-07-16	Sunny Blossom	Grounding	M99C0027
99-07-20	Nanticoke	Fire	M99F0023
99-08-17	Mandarin Arrow	Grounding	M99W0145
99-09-25	Canmar Valour	Fall overboard	M99L0099
99-10-14	Joseph & Sisters	Sinking	M99M0142
99-12-01	Wet n' Wild II	Capsizing and sinking	M99M0161
99-12-28	Juneau, Seaspan Pacer, Escort Eagle	Fall overboard	M99F0038
00-01-15	Sea Cap XII, T.L. Sharpe	Striking	M00W0005
00-03-18	BCM Atlantic	Sinking	M00N0009
00-03-28	Lori Cathlynn	Capsizing	M00W0044
00-05-12	Miss Gatineau	Fall overboard	M00L0043
00-06-16	True North II	Sinking	M00C0033

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