Communiqués

TSB # M 03/2001

(Hull, Quebec, 13 March 2001) - The Transportation Safety Board of Canada has released its report on the sinking of the scallop dragger "BRIER MIST".

In its report, the Board has identified safety deficiencies related to the inspection and watertightness of hatch covers on small fishing vessels, the absence of automatic release mechanisms on liferafts and the absence of emergency position indicating radio beacons (EPIRBs). The Board has issued four safety recommendations to address these safety deficiencies.

On 27 ovember 1998, while crossing between Les Escoumins and Rimouski, Quebec, in foul weather, the master of the scallop dragger "BRIER MIST" informed Marine Communications and Traffic Services that he thought the hold and afterpeak were taking on water and that the pumps were not able to cope. At about 1500, the vessel foundered some 10 autical miles off Rimouski. Search and rescue (SAR) operations found no trace of the wreck or of three of the five crew members. The two recovered victims had drowned.

The sinking of the "BRIER MIST" demonstrates the risks to which small fishing vessel crews may be exposed. Between 1975 and 1999, 125 Canadian fishing vessels either capsized or foundered, resulting in 260 fatalities. A large number of these accidents involved downflooding due to inefficient, defective or ineffectively secured hatch and/or scuttle covers.

The Board is concerned that Transport Canada's efforts have not been entirely effective in achieving industry compliance with the safety requirement of ensuring that the fish holds can be made watertight. In its response to recommendations from the coroner's inquest into this accident, Transport Canada has indicated that it is aware of the problems with the watertight integrity of some small fishing vessel hatch covers and that action will be taken to ensure that openings on fishing vessel decks are adequately protected. However, given the deficiencies noted over the past 10 years in the design, manufacturing, installation, maintenance and inspection of small fishing vessel hold closure systems, the Board is still very concerned about the loss of lives in this sector of the marine industry and has recommended that:

• The fishing industry and the Department of Transport give increased attention to small fishing vessel hatch covers to help ensure that these covers are watertight and can be effectively secured. [M00-06]

The crew's chances of survival in an emergency depend on the capacity, reliability and availability of life-saving equipment. More deficient liferafts have also been identified in the last five years suggesting that there is a significant number of inadequate life-saving survival craft aboard small fishing vessels.

The Board has previously expressed its concern that the absence of automatic release mechanisms on liferafts on small fishing vessels needlessly compromises the chances of survival of crews in an emergency at sea when the liferaft goes down with the vessel. As the chances of survival of fishermen on abandoning the vessel depend on launching the liferafts, and considering the extremely difficult conditions in which abandonments are often carried out on small fishing vessels, the Board is of the opinion that liferafts should be easy to release when the vessel sinks in order to allow the crew members to access the liferafts on abandoning ship and has recommended that:

• The Department of Transport alert builders and owners of fishing vessels to the need for the liferafts on all vessels to be stowed with a launching system fitted with a release mechanism that allows the inflatable liferaft to be easily released when the vessel sinks. [M00-07]
• The Department of Transport examine the effectiveness of liferaft automatic release mechanisms to prevent premature activation of these mechanisms on small fishing vessels in rough sea conditions. [M00-08]

In a distress situation where a vessel sinks and the EPIRB is deployed and emits a signal, the SAR resources are alerted to initiate action. The signal includes an identifier which enables the SAR controller to have valuable information about the vessel and the owner. Further, as the SAR craft respond to the site, the beacon continues to send its position allowing the SAR craft to home in on it, thus substantially reducing search time and improving the probability of survival.

In the sinking of the "CAPE ASPY" off Nova Scotia on 30 January 1993, the EPIRB signal was picked up a few moments after the vessel sank, and the Halifax Rescue Coordination Centre was therefore able to undertake a SAR operation in less than 10 inutes. The saving of several lives has been attributed mainly to the automatically deploying EPIRB.

The Board is of the opinion that all fishermen should have the same distress-alerting capability that should not rely on human intervention. Further, fishermen forced into the water or survival craft should have the capability to continuously update their position to SAR coordinators and responders as the effects of wind and current cause them to drift. The Board has therefore recommended that:

• The Department of Transport require small fishing vessels engaging in coastal voyages to carry an emergency position indicating radio beacon or other appropriate equipment that floats free, automatically activates, alerts the search and rescue system, and provides position updates and homing-in capabilities. [M00-09]

The Board is concerned by the lack of safety action taken on water level detectors, protection from hypothermia and drowning, and marine emergency duties training for fishermen following recommendations previously issued by the Board and recommendations issued last year by the Chief Coroner as a result of this accident. The Board will continue to assess the safety action taken by Transport Canada in these areas.

The Transportation Safety Board of Canada is an independent agency operating under its own Act of Parliament. Its sole aim is the advancement of transportation safety. It is not the function of the Board to assign fault or determine civil or criminal liability.

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