Communiqués

TSB # M13/99

(Hull, Quebec) 09 June 1999 - The final report on the Transportation Safety Board of Canada's (TSB) investigation into the explosion and fire aboard the petroleum tanker "PETROLAB" and the subsequent destruction of the government wharf at St. Barbe, Newfoundland, on 19 July 1997, has been released today.

The explosion and fire on board the "PETROLAB", which was constructed in 1962, occurred during the evening while the crew was washing cargo oil tanks in preparation for loading cargo. The ship's owner was killed and three members of the crew, one of whom later died in hospital, were injured by the explosion. The ensuing on-board fire subsequently spread to the government wharf, and the combined efforts of two Canadian Coast Guard vessels and several shore-based fire departments were required to bring the fire under control. Both the ship and the wharf were destroyed before the fire was fully extinguished some 63 hours later.

The Board has determined that the explosion occurred due to an accumulation of gasoline vapour. The source of ignition was not determined. Among the factors contributing to the explosion were: the owner's and crew's ignorance of safe working practices for tankers; the improvised and unsafe working practices devised to replace a fixed tank system that had been inoperable for at least 10 years; the use of pumping equipment uncertified for use in a hazardous environment; and the presence of substandard electrical equipment and fittings in the engine-room.

During the course of its investigation, the TSB advised Transport Canada (TC) of several safety problems. In response to four TSB Safety Advisories, a number of safety actions were taken by TC to address the identified problems.

The first TSB Safety Advisory stressed the importance for tanker owners to maintain the operational integrity and the safe working condition of all sub-elements of a tanker cargo-pumping equipment and stripping system. TC has indicated its intention to issue a Ship Safety Bulletin to remind tanker owners of the hazards associated with improper practices and to consult vessel operators and other interested parties regarding a more comprehensive inspection program to verify the operational integrity of cargo-pumping systems on oil tankers.

The second TSB Safety Advisory apprised TC of several unsafe work practices - such as tank washing with improper equipment and slop transfer into inadequate spaces - employed for many years on the "PETROLAB". Such practices were the result of crew members' insufficient awareness of the hazards inherent in tanker operations. Not all crew members held a petroleum tanker endorsement, and those who did had never taken a petroleum tanker safety course. Consequently, unsafe work practices were perpetuated and reinforced. The TSB indicated the need for TC to reassess its requirements for the issuance and renewal of petroleum tanker endorsements. Subsequently, TC indicated that, as part of the Continued Proficiency Endorsement process, a regulatory change is to be implemented requiring that all certificate holders revalidate their Tanker Certificates every five years.

In February 1998, TC and the Canadian Association of Fire Chiefs (CAFC) were requested, through a TSB Safety Advisory, to expedite their safety audit and review of risks and contingency measures in Canadian ports and harbours that contain oil terminals. Through a survey it conducted, the CAFC found enough information to raise concerns that the firefighting services available in municipalities with public ports may not be adequate to provide firefighting services in the event of a fire on board a vessel.

The fourth TSB Safety Advisory apprised TC of the potential risk to the public due to simultaneous oil tanker and passenger vessel operations in small public harbours. TC recognized the risk and indicated that several precautionary measures are already in place, including the posting of "no smoking" signs and the requirements to have an individual stand by the manifold and to have fire extinguishers near the manifold during tanker cargo loading and unloading operations.

The Transportation Safety Board of Canada is an independent agency operating under its own Act of Parliament. Its sole aim is the advancement of transportation safety. No finding of the Board shall be construed as assigning fault or determining civil or criminal liability. Further, the findings of the Board are not binding on the parties to any legal, disciplinary or other proceedings.

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