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TSB # M 15/98

TSB INVESTIGATION CONTINUES INTO THE ACCIDENT 16 JANUARY 1998 INVOLVING THE "FLARE"

(For release 18 November 1998)

(Hull, Quebec) - The investigation by the Transportation Safety Board of Canada is continuing into the sinking of the "FLARE". The vessel left Rotterdam, Netherlands, on 30 December 1997, in a light ballasted condition, bound for Montreal, Quebec. The "FLARE" encountered adverse weather throughout the entire voyage. On the night of 15 January 1998, the winds were south-westerly at 40 knots, with seas of six to seven metres, and a water temperature of one degree Celsius.

At 0429 on 16 January 1998, while south of Newfoundland, a difficult to understand Mayday was transmitted from the vessel shortly after she broke in two. The stern section, containing the crew accommodation, sank within approximately 20 minutes in 360 m of water, WSW of the French islands of Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon. The bow section drifted for four days before sinking in approximately 100 m of water near the western edge of Banquereau Bank off Nova Scotia.

The rescue operation was coordinated by the Rescue Coordination Centre in Halifax. Out of 25 crew members, 4 survived. They were rescued by a Canadian Search and Rescue helicopter from an overturned lifeboat which had broken free from the vessel. The survivors, who were suffering from hypothermia, were flown to the closest hospital at Saint-Pierre. The search for other survivors continued for another day. Fifteen bodies were eventually recovered and taken to St. John's, Newfoundland, where they were identified and the causes of death determined to be hypothermia and/or drowning. The crew comprised four nationalities: Greek (4), Yugoslav (3), Romanian (2) and Philipinos (16).

An investigation by the TSB was initiated and relevant vessel information was gathered, including recent surveys and Port State Control inspections.

The vessel's certificates and the certificates of competency of the master, officers and crew were found to be up to date and to conform to the standards for this type of vessel and the voyage on which she was engaged.

The "FLARE" was a seven-hold, dry-cargo bulk carrier of 16,947 gross tons with the accommodation and main engine aft. The vessel was 180.8 m long, with a beam of 23.17 m, and draughts, on departing Rotterdam, of 3 m forward and 7 m aft. The owner of the vessel was ABTA Shipping, Cyprus, with the vessel registered in Cyprus. This ship, built in 1972, was older than the average bulk carriers currently in service.

Under the Enhanced Survey Programme (ESP), special hull and machinery surveys are carried out every five years, the extent of which depends on the age of the ship; the older the ship, the more extensive is the survey. In addition, further surveys are carried out annually.

One of these special surveys was carried out on the "FLARE" from November 1995 to January 1996 at which time extensive renewal of steel structural members under the main deck was performed. The vessel last underwent a scheduled annual survey in November 1997.

The TSB has interviewed the surviving crew members, and crew from previous voyages, and collected relevant data on the ship, including previous class and regulatory surveys, Port State Control inspection documents, sailing documents as well as construction plans and specifications. Aerial photographs of the floating bow section were also obtained and reviewed. This information provided the investigation team with some indication of what might have happened, but did not reveal the failure sequence or mechanism which led to the vessel breaking apart. The location and extent of the principal fractures in the main deck and starboard side shell plating are visible in the aerial photographs. However, details of the structural damage in the lower parts of the hull could only be determined by underwater inspection.

As in most investigations, the answers to "where" and "when" are available, but "why" is the most vital question. In an endeavour to enhance marine safety and to prevent further loss of life, the TSB organized a dive on the bow section of the "FLARE" with a remotely operated vehicle (ROV). The aim of the underwater inspection was to examine the sunken hull and obtain video and photographic records of the damaged structure exposed above the seabed.

The underwater inspection was conducted in July 1998 with the assistance of the Canadian Coast Guard, who provided the TSB with a stable dive platform, the CCGS "EARL GREY".

The ROV that the TSB investigation team used is called "Sea Rover". It is connected to a control centre on the mother ship by a tether which relays the electrical power to manoeuvre it, to power the lights and to control the on-board cameras and thrusters. The machine is able to move up and down, left and right, forward and backward, and spin horizontally. This ROV can dive to a depth of 420 m and is equipped with video cameras and one still camera. A miniature sonar is used to guide the ROV to areas of interest and the video and still cameras are used to take high resolution and stereographic photographs. Due to technical difficulties, the still camera did not function as expected and the video recordings were the only imagery obtained.

The bow section was found to be virtually upside-down on the seabed with the starboard side deck buried in the silt. The ROV was "flown" to the bow area, where the vessel's name was identified, up the hull to the ship's bottom, along the port side bilge keel and down the aft end of the wreck where it had separated from the aft section. Areas of the port side of the main deck, ship side and some internal structures were also accessed. Good video imagery was obtained and was taken to the TSB Engineering Laboratory in Ottawa where investigators were able to study particular sections of the damaged hull.

Information currently available would indicate that the "FLARE" was subjected to hull slamming and pounding in heavy seas for several days and the hull failure was most likely initiated by brittle fracturing which resulted in the loss of longitudinal structural integrity. Rapid progression of the fractures in the upper part of the hull would have resulted in excessive compression stresses on the bottom structure, leading to sudden failure and complete hull separation. The investigation work is continuing into these cause-related aspects.

The information gathered from the dive is just one facet of the continuing TSB investigation into this accident. The investigation team is also addressing such aspects as the operation of the vessel, the quantity and distribution of ballast, the maintenance of the vessel, the survival equipment on board and the search and rescue operation.

The TSB will issue a public report upon completion of its investigation. However, the Board may also issue interim recommendations at any time during the investigation if safety deficiencies are identified that pose serious risk to persons, property, or the environment.

The Transportation Safety Board of Canada is an independent agency operating under its own Act of Parliament. Its sole aim is advancing transportation safety. It is not the function of the Board to assign fault or determine civil or criminal liability.

NOTE: This update is based on information assembled by investigation staff and will be amended as other facts are gathered. The investigation is not complete and one should not attempt to infer findings as to the causes and contributing factors of this accident on the basis of this update.

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