TSB # M 06/96
FIVE MARINE SAFETY RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING THE SAFETY OF SMALL SIGHT-SEEING VESSELS AS A RESULT OF TWO SEPARATE INVESTIGATIONS INTO THE GROUNDING, 11-08-93, AND THE SINKING, 12-09-93, OF THE "TAN 1" IN THE ST. LAWRENCE RIVER OFF LES ESCOUMINS, QUEBEC
REPORTS No. M93L0003 & M93L0004
(For release 25 April 1996)
(Hull, Quebec) - The Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) has released five marine safety recommendations concerning the safety of small sight-seeing vessels. These recommendations have come about as a result of investigations into two accidents in 1993 involving the 7.6-metre "TAN 1" on whale- watching cruises in the St. Lawrence River, near Les Escoumins, Quebec. The accidents, a grounding on 11 August and a capsizing and sinking on 12 September, fortunately did not result in any fatalities or serious injuries.
In the first occurrence, the "TAN 1" departed Les Escoumins at approximately 1715 EDT, in fog and restricted visibility. There were 12 passengers and one operator on board. As the cruise progressed, the operator became disoriented, and the boat ran aground on a large rock. The pilot boat "ABRAHAM MARTIN", as part of a search and rescue (SAR) effort, found the vessel and escorted her back to port. None of the occupants sustained injuries.
The Board determined that the "TAN 1" departed on the cruise in restricted visibility with inadequate safety equipment and without having on board the navigational instruments necessary for a safe cruise. The SAR operations were hampered by the failure of the radio and the absence of a radar reflector on board the "TAN 1". The boat operator had not been trained for instrument navigation nor did he hold a radio operator's certificate.
In the second occurrence, the "TAN 1" departed Anse aux Basques at approximately 1515 EDT. As the cruise progressed, the winds from the south-west picked up and the sea became increasingly choppy. About two hours later, the engines failed and water began to flood the boat, waves broke over the stern, and the vessel capsized. The 13 persons on board were dumped into the water, but were quickly rescued by other sight- seeing vessels in the area.
The Board determined that the outboard motors of the "TAN 1" stalled and could not be restarted because the fuel was contaminated with water. Shortly thereafter, the drifting boat was flooded by the stern and eventually capsized. The bilge pumps were inoperable and the passengers had received no safety instructions regarding the lifejackets before departure.
Following the first occurrence, the Canadian Coast Guard (CCG) issued a detaining order requiring the owner to improve the navigation equipment of his vessels to comply with the regulations. This included the fitting of a commercial radar reflector and the installation of a watertight VHF receiver with a battery charger connected to the motor. The company also began to file sail plans with Vessel Traffic Centre (VTC) at Les Escoumins to advise authorities of when and where they were taking their cruises, in case of emergency.
After the capsizing and sinking of the "TAN 1", the TSB examined the salvaged vessel and noted a number of deficiencies that jeopardized her seaworthiness; e.g. fuel contamination and design / construction standards. The CCG subsequently provided technical advice to the owner to render the vessel seaworthy.
The Canada Shipping Act (CSA) does not require operators of vessels five tons or under that carry not more than 12 passengers to hold a certificate of competency, nor do they need to have their vessels inspected or to demonstrate their navigational skills.
There is an increasing number of these small boat sight-seeing operations carrying fare-paying passengers, and the TSB believes that it is important for the safety of those fare-paying passengers that operators of those boats have formal marine training. Some owners' associations are aware of the shortcomings in the training and have asked that training courses be developed to meet their specific needs. The Board welcomes this initiative, but is concerned that there is currently no training required to operate these vessels and has therefore recommended that:
The Department of Transport develop training standards and certification requirements for the operators of small sight-seeing boats that carry fare-paying passengers. [M96-01]
The TSB is concerned that, since these boats are not "inspected" vessels, they are not required to be fitted with radio equipment necessary for effective communication in distress or emergency situations. Therefore, the Board has recommended that:
The Department of Transport amend the regulations to require sight-seeing boats that carry fare-paying passengers to be fitted with adequate radio equipment and to report to the VTC, before departure, the number of persons on board. [M96-02]
Furthermore, the Board is concerned about the adequacy of the safety equipment carried on board these sight-seeing vessels and its possible effect on the safety of fare-paying passengers. The TSB notes that the CCG does not have an inspection and prevention program for these vessels, but that SAR personnel carry out courtesy inspections of pleasure craft. Other agencies, who, under the mandate of the Small Vessel Regulations, can carry out inspections of sight-seeing vessels, do not have the resources to adequately monitor these boats. Therefore, the Board has recommended that:
The Department of Transport and the Department of Fisheries and Oceans, in cooperation with police forces and SAR personnel, explore means of improving the monitoring and inspection of small passenger-carrying commercial vessels. [M96-03]
Five-gross-ton vessels like the "TAN 1" are not required to undergo CCG safety inspections nor are they required to meet mandatory design requirements. Every year in Canada, a large number of sight-seeing boats, more than 40 in the Tadoussac area alone, operate without having been inspected by the CCG.
However, the passengers who board these boats assume that they are seaworthy and safe. In the absence of mandatory requirements, CCG surveyors do not have the necessary regulatory instruments to improve the safety of these boats. The public has to rely on the operators to maintain these vessels in a seaworthy condition. In some cases, as shown by these two occurrences, the public can be unwittingly exposed to inherently unsafe operations. The Board therefore has recommended that:
The Department of Transport require all small boats that carry fare-paying passengers to undergo safety inspections to ensure their seaworthiness and operational safety. [M96-04]
In a number of these sight-seeing operations, the passengers do not receive any type of safety briefing, nor are they informed of how to use or where to find the safety equipment on board the boat. In these two occurrences, the passengers had no knowledge of the location or the use of the lifejackets carried on board. They also had received no pre-departure instructions regarding the life-saving equipment. The TSB believes that, in order to reduce the severity of accidents and to better prepare for emergency situations, passengers must be well informed of any safety precautions and measures that apply to them. The Board therefore has recommended that:
The Department of Transport require the operators of small sight-seeing boats to provide pre-departure safety instructions to the passengers for normal operating conditions and for emergency situations. [M96-05]
The Transportation Safety Board of Canada is an independent agency operating under its own Act of Parliament. Its sole aim is the advancement of transportation safety. It is not the function of the Board to assign fault or determine civil or criminal liability.