Communiqués

TSB # A 02/98

(For release 11 February 1998)

(Hull, Quebec) - The investigation by the Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) is continuing into the accident at Fredericton, New Brunswick, on the night of 16 December 1997, involving Air Canada Flight 646. The aircraft, a Canadair CL-600-219 Regional Jet with 39 passengers and 3 crew on board, was on a scheduled flight from Toronto to Fredericton when it crashed on landing at the Fredericton Airport.

The weather that evening was foggy, with an obscured ceiling of 100 feet, 1/8 mile visibility in fog, calm winds, and the temperature and dew point were minus 8°Celsius.

Information from the aircraft flight recorders, Moncton Area Control Centre (ACC) and Fredericton Flight Service Station (FSS) tapes, and witnesses suggests that the flight was normal until just before the accident. On final approach to runway 15, at about 200 feet above the ground, the crew could see the runway lights. The decision to land was made, and the autopilot was switched off for the landing. The aircraft passed over the runway threshold slightly high on the glide path and on the centre line. About 50 feet above the runway, the aircraft drifted toward the left of the runway and a go-around was initiated. During the go-around attempt, the aircraft struck the runway 3,000 feet down the 6,000-foot runway and left of the centre line. The right wing, the nose wheel, and the nose of the aircraft were damaged at impact, and many of the aircraft's systems, both electrical and mechanical, ceased their normal function. Electrical power was lost, leaving the aircraft in darkness.

After the initial impact, the aircraft continued down the runway on its main wheels with full power on both engines. The aircraft departed the runway just past the intersection with runway 09/27 and ended up on a small knoll about 1,000 feet to the right of runway 15, where the aircraft struck a large tree and stopped. The right engine stopped; however, the crew had difficulty shutting down the left engine. The left throttle cable had been jammed by the tree.

The FSS specialist, in Fredericton tower, heard the aircraft go by at approximately 2348 AST. He could not see, in the limited visibility, the aircraft during the attempted landing and subsequent accident. The FSS specialist tried, unsuccessfully, to contact the crew of Flight 646 by radio, and then called the Moncton ACC to ask if anything had been heard from Flight 646. At approximately 2350, the FSS specialist requested that the on-duty firefighter drive onto the runway to see if the aircraft was disabled. The field maintenance foreman, aware of what was going on,

joined the search in a separate vehicle. At 2358, with still no sign of the aircraft, the FSS specialist activated the airport emergency response plan (ERP), notifying emergency personnel and indicating that there likely had been an accident involving Flight 646. The accident was confirmed when one of the passengers, who had walked to the runway from the accident site, was encountered at approximately 0002. Low visibility and the deep snow cover hampered locating and reaching the aircraft. A snow-blower was able to clear a roadway to the accident site by 0038.

The force of the impact with the tree crushed the left side passenger door and cut a 10-foot swath into the passenger compartment. Nine passengers were seriously injured, most of whom were sitting in the area where the tree penetrated the cabin. Most of the passengers were able to release their seat belts, stand up, and exit the aircraft without difficulty. However, many persons in the forward area of the cabin had difficulty getting out of their seats. A portable "jaws-of-life" was used to assist in releasing trapped passengers. At 0234, the last passenger was removed from the aircraft.

The TSB investigation is continuing with assistance from Bombardier Inc. (Canadair), Air Canada, the National Research Council (Institute for Aerospace Research), Transport Canada, and the Air Canada Pilots Association. To date, there is no indication of any pre-impact failure or system malfunction that could have affected the flight. The investigation is concentrating on the following areas: all recording devices on the aircraft, including the stoppage of the cockpit voice recorder after the initial impact; the performance and serviceability of all aircraft systems and structures; the aircraft's performance, particularly during the attempted go-around; pilot training and the pilots' actions during the approach and landing; Air Canada's landing procedures in low visibility conditions; the adequacy of emergency response services and air traffic control services at airports such as Fredericton; and, federal regulations pertaining to the operation and support of scheduled flights such as Flight 646, including the lack of a requirement to carry an emergency locator transmitter (ELT).

The TSB will issue a public report upon completion of this investigation. However, the Board will issue interim recommendations at any time during its investigation if any identified safety deficiencies posing serious risk to persons, property, or the environment require urgent action.

The Transportation Safety Board of Canada is an independent agency operating under its own Act of Parliament. Its sole aim is the advancement of transportation safety. It is not the function of the Board to assign fault or determine civil or criminal liability.

NOTE: This update is based on information assembled by investigation staff and will be amended as other facts are gathered. The investigation is not complete and one should not attempt to infer findings as to the causes and contributing factors of the accident on the basis of this update.

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